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FREE TRADE IN ELECTRIC POWER 
 
Joel B. Eisen* and Felix Mormann** 
 
Abstract 
This Article develops the core legal framework of a new electricity 
trading ecosystem in which anyone, anytime, anywhere, can trade 
electricity in any amount with anyone else. The proliferation of solar and 
other distributed energy resources, business model innovation in the 
sharing economy, and climate change present enormous challenges—and 
opportunities—for America’s energy economy. But the electricity industry 
is ill-equipped to adapt to and benefit from these transformative forces, 
with much of its physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and 
business models relics of the early days of electrification. This Article 
suggests a systematic rethinking to usher in a new trading paradigm and 
propel the electric utility industry into the twenty-first century. 
This model has the potential to revolutionize the way electricity is 
generated, delivered, and used without requiring dramatic legal reform or 
radically new technologies. Instead, this Article draws on recent Supreme 
Court precedent and readily available technologies to democratize the 
electric grid and unlock free trade in electric power. It refines and expands 
pilot initiatives currently under way in California and New York to 
combine existing wholesale markets with new trading platforms similar to 
Airbnb and Uber. Enhanced market access will empower previously 
captive consumers to emancipate themselves from their local utilities 
while also ensuring the proper valuation and integration of a diverse 
portfolio of energy resources. 
Transformative change, however necessary and beneficial in the long 
run, will not come easily in an industry famous for its resistance to reform 
efforts of any kind. Accordingly, this proposal does not start with a clean 
slate, but, rather, envisions a hybrid system where competitive markets 
coexist with traditional utility governance structures while regulators and 
stakeholders adjust to the new trading paradigm. 
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This Article develops the core legal framework under which anyone, anytime, 
anywhere, can trade electricity in any amount with anyone else. Going well beyond 
the scope of any contemporary discussion, the authors propose an ecosystem in 
which electricity transforms from a basic service into a widely traded commodity.  
Much of the physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and business 
models of today’s electric grid dates back to the early days of electrification. Since 
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the late nineteenth century, electricity has been generated by monopoly utilities in 
large, remotely sited power plants, and delivered to ratepayers via wires designed 
for one-way traffic, all subject to regulatory oversight by state and federal agencies.1 
These structures and processes helped launch America’s electricity industry. But 
they are ill-equipped to address the daunting challenges and enormous opportunities 
facing the industry today. The proliferation of smaller-scale distributed energy 
resources, fast paced technology and business model innovation, and anthropogenic 
climate change, among others, require a systematic rethinking of the way electricity 
is generated, delivered, and used.  
Integration of a growing share of solar, wind, and other distributed energy 
resources offers a multitude of environmental, economic, and security benefits. 
Traditional thermal power plants are known to emit carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases that exacerbate global climate change as well as a series of more 
locally felt air pollutants. Renewable generators, on the other hand, are practically 
carbon neutral and cause virtually no pollution to their immediate environment, 
allowing them to be sited closer to consumers. The resulting proximity between 
generation and consumption eliminates the need for costly new transmission and 
alleviates congestion issues in today’s increasingly outdated and, hence, often 
undersized transmission system. With their greater geographic dispersion, 
distributed energy resources have the potential to greatly improve the electric grid’s 
reliability and resilience reducing, for example, the vulnerability to isolated terrorist 
attacks on individual power plants or the risk of cascading brownouts and blackouts. 
But today’s grid is poorly adapted to accommodate and harness these and other 
benefits of distributed energy resources. Until now, grid operations and management 
have generally assumed a unidirectional flow of electricity—starting with utilities 
that develop central power stations and generate electricity for sale and delivery to 
customers. Yet, most solar and other distributed energy resources are owned and 
operated by customers, not utilities, and there is little centralized utility control over 
these assets and no rules to govern, let alone promote, multidirectional interaction.  
The prevailing regulatory model—another relic of the early days of 
electrification—protects incumbent utilities against competition from distributed 
energy resources and other innovative technologies. As utilities embrace innovation2 
with industry typical caution,3 however, new entrants to the electricity sector in 																																																								
1 See, e.g., New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2002) (discussing the shared 
allocation of regulatory authority between state and federal agencies). 
2 Following noted economist Joseph Schumpeter, the authors define innovation as a 
three-staged process that distinguishes between invention as an idea’s first practical 
demonstration, innovation as its first commercial application, and diffusion as the market 
penetration of a technology or process. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2d ed. 1936).  
3 See AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, A BUSINESS PLAN FOR AMERICA’S ENERGY 
FUTURE 6 (2010) (reporting R&D spending as share of sales to be more than 60 times lower 
for the energy industry than for pharmaceuticals); see also Felix Mormann, Requirements 
for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 903, 917 (2011) [hereinafter Mormann, 
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restructured parts of the country are increasingly outpacing them with novel 
technologies, services, and business models.4 The resulting threat to the utility 
business model, sometimes described as a looming “death spiral,” raises difficult 
questions over the future composition of reliable electric service.5  
This Article proposes a new trading paradigm for electric power that promotes 
greater competition and innovation across the value chain, while recognizing the 
need for a continued, albeit modernized role for utility incumbents. This approach 
has the potential to revolutionize America’s energy economy without requiring 
dramatic legal reform or radically new technologies and business models. Instead, 
this proposal relies on recent Supreme Court precedent,6 readily available 
technologies, such as smart meters and solar photovoltaics,7 and well-established 
business structures such as existing wholesale electricity markets and trading 
platforms comparable to those of Airbnb and Uber.8 The new power trading 																																																								
Renewables Revolution] (tracing the electric utility industry’s low R&D spending to 
traditional models of rate regulation).  
4 Solar power combined with energy storage is an example of such innovation and 
synergies, as exemplified by the merger of Tesla and SolarCity. Leslie Picker & Bill Vlasic, 
In Tesla-SolarCity Deal, a Bet on Musk’s Vision and Investors’ Patience, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/business/dealbook/tesla-
solar-city-merger-elon-musk.html [https://perma.cc/CU4K-DJC6]. 
5 Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and What 
Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 3, 4 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual 
Electricity Federalism] (discussing the threat to utilities’ business models from increasing 
deployments of DERs); Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition 
Mean a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L. J. 1, 44 (2014); Felix Mormann, 
Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1668–69 (2015) [hereinafter Mormann, 
Clean Energy Federalism]; PETER KIND & ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADVOCATES, 
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A 
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1 (2013). 
6 See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1291 (2016) (affirming the 
Fourth Circuit’s finding that a state scheme that provided subsidies through state mandated 
contracts “impermissibly intrudes upon the wholesale electricity market”); F.E.R.C. v. Elec. 
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016) (noting that FERC “may not regulate either 
within-state wholesale sales or . . . retail sales of electricity”); ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015) (holding that the Natural Gas Act “does not pre-empt . . . state-
law antitrust suits”). 
7 The cost of solar power is dropping, and it has achieved “grid parity” (cost equal to 
that of power generated from fossil fuels) under favorable conditions in many parts of the 
nation, with costs continuing to drop. BRONSKI ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION 
6 (2014). For a discussion of smart meters’ role in a modern grid, see Joel B. Eisen, Smart 
Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2013) 
[hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation].   
8 Others have suggested applying this analogy to the electric industry. See, e.g., Rocky 
Mountain Inst., An Airbnb or Uber for the Electricity Grid?, GRID UNLOCKED (Sept. 2, 2014, 
10:24 PM), http://www.gridunlocked.com/2014/09/02/an-airbnb-or-uber-for-the-electricity-
grid/ [https://perma.cc/HC3W-RGAE] (suggesting that “the electricity grid be next to go the 
way of a sharing economy”). Part III, discusses this idea and propose its adoption.   
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paradigm can be implemented in the near to medium term, not decades from now. 
Change is already underway as evidenced by the proliferation of distributed energy 
resources at what is commonly referred to as “the edge of the grid.”9 This approach 
turns the idea of the “edge of the grid” on its head, transforming it from a 
marginalized locus to the center stage on which the future of the electricity sector 
will be decided.  
The advantages of free trade in electric power are diverse and numerous. This 
Article highlights the significant economic and grid management benefits. From an 
economic perspective, an electricity trading ecosystem allows for proper valuation 
and, ultimately, monetization of the electricity products and services that distributed 
energy resources provide to the grid—with inadequate, if any, reward offered under 
the current system. As these distributed resources continue to proliferate, the grid 
requires an increasingly inclusive control paradigm. The new power trading 
paradigm provides critical economic incentives for those who construct and 
upgrade, and own and manage the assets necessary to maintain reliability of service 
in an increasingly multidimensional grid. 
“Electricity trading ecosystem” is used to describe a new environment that 
connects many different persons and entities through a wide range of interactions 
across the electric grid. The authors envision a future where, at the traditional end 
of the spectrum, incumbent utilities might continue to buy and sell electricity. At the 
same time, a new paradigm incorporating trading platforms can and should enable 
more innovative transactions among more nontraditional actors. Owners of 
residential solar power systems, for instance, could trade their power with neighbors 
who, in turn, might provide backup storage capacity for cloudy days. In this 
ecosystem, individual users of electricity are no longer limited to the role of 
consumers at the cul-de-sac of a grid operating in one-way traffic mode.10 Rather, 
they interact with the grid as sophisticated agents who both buy and sell electricity 
in multidimensional markets created for this purpose. Electric power itself will cease 
to be a basic service provided to end users by an oligopoly of electric utilities. 
Instead, electricity will become a fungible commodity with value understood and 
capitalized upon by a broad spectrum of market participants in a wide array of 
transactions. National laboratories and scholars outside of the legal field have done 
																																																								
9 See, e.g., David Roberts, What’s Threatening Utilities: Innovation at the Edge of the 
Grid (with dik-diks!), GRIST (May 29, 2013), http://grist.org/article/whats-threatening-
utilities-innovation-at-the-edge-of-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/8YXQ-V4X3] (discussing 
“where innovation on the distribution edge is headed”). 
10 For decades, many have aspired to this. In the 1970s, for example, MIT professor 
Fred Schweppe and others first proposed involving electricity consumers in markets. FRED 
C. SCHWEPPE ET AL., HOMEOSTATIC CONTROL: THE UTILITY/CUSTOMER MARKETPLACE FOR 
ELECTRIC POWER 8 (1981) (showing in Figure 1 a proposed “Energy Marketplace,” 
presciently showing a “Marketplace Controller,” “Energy Brokers,” and “Information 
Consultants” as intermediaries). 
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excellent work on the conceptual framework for widespread electricity trading, 
mostly under the banner of “transactive energy.”11 
The time has come to reimagine the electric grid as a multidimensional 
networked ecosystem that invites new resources and actors without sacrificing the 
current system’s peerless reliability.12 The burgeoning literature on energy law and 
policy tends to hone in on individual aspects and components of the electric system, 
such as: promoting greater renewable energy development;13 building more 
transmission lines;14 and clarifying the shared allocation of authority between 
federal and state regulation.15 The benefits of such focused inquiries 
notwithstanding, the complex interdependencies among the electricity sector’s 
various components, call for a more holistic, network-wide analysis.  
																																																								
11 See THE GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, GRIDWISE TRANSACTIVE ENERGY 
FRAMEWORK VERSION 1.0 iii (2015); D.J. HAMMERSTROM ET AL., VALUATION OF 
TRANSACTIVE SYSTEMS 3.1 (2016); HOWARD HARARY, NIST AND ENGINEERING 
LABORATORY UPDATE 15–16 (2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
2016/09/01/sgac-meeting-presentations-07-13-2016.pdf (detailing testing and standards 
development programs at the National Institute of Standards and Technology to support 
transactive energy); Lynne Kiesling, Implications of Smart Grid Innovation for 
Organizational Models in Electricity Distribution, in WILEY HANDBOOK OF SMART GRID 
HANDBOOK (John Wiley & Sons eds., 2016); D.J. HAMMERSTROM ET AL., THE TRANSACTIVE 
SYSTEM 2.3–2.4 (2015), https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/TPR02TheTransactiveCoordinat 
ionSystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG8Y-QRQ8] (discussing the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory’s field demonstrations to test transactive energy concepts, including the Olympic 
Peninsula Project and its successor, the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration, which 
linked utility customers in five Pacific Northwest states.). This proposal builds on these 
works, making selective use of specific regulatory initiatives as foundations, and extends 
them to a national system for the generation and delivery of electricity that would take shape 
in the years or even decades to come. 
12 “Reliability” has a very different meaning in an ecosystem where numerous and 
diverse electricity resources are brought on the grid and traded, posing considerable 
challenges to policymakers charged with safeguarding reliability. Infra Part IV. 
13 See Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. 
REV. 339, 367 (2011) [hereinafter Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy]; Felix Mormann, 
Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681, 734 (2012). 
14 See James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development 
of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L. J. 71, 88–89 (2014); Alexandra 
B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: 
A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1873 (2012). 
15 See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and 
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 893 (2016); Joel B. Eisen, 
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform The Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 
1843–45 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority]; Felix Mormann, 
Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for State Climate Policy 
Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 241–42 (2017) [hereinafter Mormann, State 
Climate Policy Innovation]; Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. 
L. REV. 399, 465–66 (2016). 
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Robust markets for wholesale transactions have become a staple of electricity 
trading in many parts of the country, so the first broad brushstrokes of this blueprint 
have already been sketched. This approach retains these markets along with their 
regional governance mechanisms, and expands them to facilitate trading by new 
market entrants that aggregate smaller amounts of electricity into larger blocks. In 
addition, the authors propose a new form of platform-based markets established and 
overseen by state public utility commissions for bilateral transactions among 
individuals trading smaller amounts of electricity and related activities. These are 
termed “state markets”16 to emphasize their geographic scope, to avoid any potential 
confusion with ongoing retail restructuring initiatives, and to invoke the states’ 
historical role in regulating direct sales to end users, which these markets would 
enable.17  
The type of multidimensional market envisioned has become increasingly 
common, most notably in the so called “sharing” economy, with examples including 
Airbnb, Uber, and others.18 On these platforms, participants trade with each other 
over networks, under preapproved rules, designed to facilitate and simplify their 
interactions. As economists have demonstrated, properly designed platform markets 
have positive “network effects,” such as greater innovation and consumer 
participation.19 This Article considers the prospect for such positive externalities an 
important reason to promote more trading in the electricity sector.  
This approach builds on the progress that two pioneering states—California and 
New York—are making toward identifying and crafting critical building blocks of 
an electricity trading ecosystem. In both cases, the states are moving forward with 
utility participation and approval. California’s initiative affects existing wholesale 
markets, while New York seeks to create new markets to be administered by its 
utilities. This approach combines expanded and refined versions of these two 
programs into a unified, multidimensional “smart” platform architecture for trading 
and delivering electricity that can support a variety of business models to enable all 
or part of the system’s functions. The authors lack a crystal orb, so this model 
incorporates the flexibility and adaptability required to support all of the types of 
transactions that the new electricity trading ecosystem can and should enable. 
Part I begins the explanation of the proposal with a description of the new 
trading paradigm and a non-exhaustive overview of the diverse and numerous types 
of interactions envisioned. Against this background, Part I discusses the need for 
fundamental physical, regulatory, and business reforms of the electric grid to support 
transactions in new products and services among a wide range of entities. As part of 																																																								
16 This Article deliberately does not use the “retail” label for these markets, as they 
would facilitate both retail and wholesale transactions, with the latter occurring at a smaller 
scale than their FERC approved counterparts. 
17 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2015); New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (“States 
have jurisdiction over the retail sale of power . . . .”). 
18 See Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY 
L. J. 333, 335 (2017). 
19 See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
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this discussion, the authors lay out some of the many reasons why a system in which 
anyone can trade electricity should exist.  
Part II establishes and defines five overarching goals that any electricity trading 
ecosystem should strive to achieve, and seven core principles of this specific 
proposal. Unlike some visions for the electricity sector’s future,20 this approach is 
grid-centered and does not envision full disruption of utilities—by cable TV 
providers or Internet companies such as Google and Facebook—as an inevitable 
outcome. Instead, the authors propose an evolutionary design that builds on the 
existing system and initiatives already underway. This Article contemplates that 
growing expertise with these experimental policies will inexorably usher in the new 
trading paradigm.  
The authors recognize the challenges inherent in any attempt to develop free 
markets within the context of a heavily regulated environment, and the potential for 
attendant waste and inefficiencies. Nonetheless, given the unique characteristics of 
this industry, the authors argue that utilities and other stakeholders with vested 
interests in the electricity sector, and regulators seeking to maintain system stability 
and reliability, will prefer a policy and legal framework that is evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary. This approach also respects the difficult, and shifting, nature of 
the divide between federal and state regulatory authority over the electric grid.21 
Part III places this model in the context of ongoing policy experiments with 
greater power trading. The first such experiment is California’s initiative to allow 
owners of distributed energy resources (“DERs”), such as small-scale solar power, 
to sell electricity into the California Independent System Operator’s (“CAISO”) 
wholesale markets via providers that aggregate individual resources into larger 
blocks. The second is New York’s ambitious plan to transform its distribution 
utilities into system operators and administrators of markets for electricity and 
related products and services.  
Next, this Article discusses how these experiments could combine and evolve 
into the foundation of an electricity trading ecosystem. Both experiments are in 
early, quasi pilot stages and both would have to be expanded considerably to allow 
for full consumer market access. Accordingly, this Article draws on these initiatives 
to develop a general framework, leaving many implementation details to later 
discussions. The authors propose to modify and extend the CAISO aggregation 
system to all wholesale markets, as contemplated in the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s (“FERC”) recent notice of proposed rulemaking on DER 
aggregation.22 This Article further proposes that states adopt programs similar to that 																																																								
20 Todd Woody, Who Will Compete With Energy Companies in the Future? Apple, 
Comcast, and You, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 4. 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2013/11/who-will-compete-with-energy-companies-in-the-future-apple-comcast-
and-you/281109/ [https://perma.cc/9BSF-8B7X] (explaining that David Crane, CEO of 
NRG Energy, predicts that cable TV companies will compete with utilities).  
21 See infra Part IV.B. 
22 Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission 
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,522-01 (proposed Nov. 
30, 2016) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). In light of its reliance on wholesale markets 
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of New York and establish markets open to individual and other small-scale 
participants. These two steps, and coordination between wholesale and state 
markets, will go a long way toward ensuring that sellers of electricity and related 
products and services have direct access to buyers throughout the nation.  
Part IV discusses some technological and legal innovations required for the 
transition to free electricity trading, and potential obstacles. To be sure, the exact 
parameters of the new power trading paradigm will depend on the design and 
implementation choices of policymakers, regulators, grid operators, incumbent 
utilities, generators, and consumers and suppliers of electricity, among other 
stakeholders. Yet, while the precise details remain a moving target, general attributes 
are beginning to emerge,23 marking an inflection point to propose and define an 
overall direction and scope. 
 
I.  MAPPING OUT AN ELECTRICITY TRADING FUTURE 
 
Electricity systems across the United States are in the midst of a gradual but, 
ultimately, radical transformation. Restructuring efforts have led to a growing 
proliferation of wholesale power markets. Incumbent utilities that once enjoyed 
monopoly status, now compete with a growing fleet of merchant generators and, in 
some cases, merchant transmission lines. Institutionally, operation and management 
of the electric grid is increasingly regionalized in the hands of third-party entities 
known as Independent System Operators (“ISO”) and Regional Transmission 
Organizations (“RTO”).24 At the same time, public policy support motivated by 																																																								
for trading aggregated DER resources, this proposal would not extend at present to the 
smaller (and shrinking) part of the nation that does not participate in these markets, although 
states where utilities are traditionally regulated and do not take part in wholesale markets 
could adopt market structures that would have the same robust functions as the state markets 
envisioned. 
23 See generally GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11 (addressing 
transactive energy from multiple perspectives including business and policy considerations, 
business models, value creation, and providing conceptual or reference architectures for 
transactive energy systems.). As another example of movement toward a technical 
foundation for trading, the National Institute of Standards and Technology is conducting a 
“Transactive Energy Challenge,” in which teams are proposing technical requirements for, 
among other benchmarks, quotes, tenders, transactions and delivery in electricity market 
systems. William Cox et al., Common Transactive Services, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH (May 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/nist-sgcps/TEChallenge/TES2016/William-
Cox-CTS.pptx [https://perma.cc/89SM-AHNK]. 
24 Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1792–93; Mormann, State 
Climate Policy Innovation, supra note 5, at 1634 n.65; Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, 
The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 153 (2016); Hari M. 
Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 50 
(discussing current ISOs/RTOs and their geographic coverage and market operations); 
Regional Transmission Organization Map, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp [https://perma.cc/PR8N-Z6T3] 
(last updated Jan. 11, 2017). 
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concerns over climate change, energy security, and technology leadership continues 
to drive up the share of solar, wind, and other renewables in the electricity mix.25 
Meanwhile, the widespread dissemination of smart meters and inverters, along with 
other infrastructure upgrades, is making the grid more intelligent.26  
The nature and scope of change underfoot along multiple dimensions—
markets, institutions, resources, and technologies, among others—have led some 
commentators to speak of a paradigm shift.27 This Article proposes a new trading 
paradigm that allows a diverse set of actors to make value-based decisions based on 
electricity markets and other economic indicators.28 Historically, the electricity 
industry has centered on creating and capturing value along a one-way path from 
generation to consumption.29 Today, utilities and third parties alike have far more 
opportunities for value creation by expanding the palette of products and services, 
particularly as the adoption of DERs empowers customers to provide excess energy 
and services to the market. Properly implemented, the ecosystem envisioned has the 
capacity to deliver the environmental, economic, and other benefits of current and 
future innovations surrounding the electric grid while safeguarding and enhancing 
its reliability and resiliency. To do so, the new power trading paradigm will need to 
facilitate a plethora of novel transactions of electricity-related products and services 
among a wide range of actors.  
 
A.  The New Power Trading Paradigm 
 
The new trading paradigm is premised on broad-based participation in grid 
operations and management by multiple parties and a more decentralized control 
system managed by utility and nonutility actors alike. To trade energy and related 
products and services, new markets will enable utilities, new entrants, and electricity 
consumers to create and capture value from their transactions. The value derived 
from these markets and the pricing signals they provide will offer powerful 
incentives for much needed investments in the nation’s dated grid infrastructure.  																																																								
25 See, e.g., Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable 
Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 55, 67–69 
(2016) (describing solar and wind deployment trends in California and Texas). 
26 See generally Eisen, Smart Regulation, supra note 7, at 10 (discussing the potential 
for and benefits of the installation of 65 million smart meters by the end of 2015). 
27 See, e.g., Farrokh A. Rahimi & Ali Ipakchi, Transactive Energy Techniques: Closing 
the Gap Between Wholesale and Retail Markets, 25 ELEC. J. 29 (2012) (“With the advent of 
microgrids and Smart Grid technologies in recent years, another paradigm shift is on the 
horizon characterized by active demand-side participation in response to environmental 
policies and electricity market prices.”). See also Steven E. Collier, The Emerging Enernet: 
Convergence of the Smart Grid with the Internet of Things, IEEE INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS 
MAG. 13 (Mar./Apr. 2017) (“The U.S. electric grid is approaching a singularity, i.e., a point 
beyond which it will be unrecognizable in terms of the physical, institutional, and economic 
principles that apply today.”). 
28 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 24. 
29 Id. at 17–18. 
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1.  Grid Challenges and Distributed Resource Opportunities 
 
No discussion of progress toward free trade in electricity would be complete 
without a description of today’s grid, which is a long way from ubiquitous 
networking. From a physical perspective, the electric grid has historically served 
largely as a one-way system.30 High-voltage transmission lines deliver electricity 
generated at power plants, of increasing size, to metropolitan areas and other load 
centers, where a network of low-voltage distribution lines facilitates delivery to end-
use customers. Since the early days of electrification, economists have considered 
the combination of centralized power generation with long-distance transmission 
and distribution a desirable attribute of grid architecture enabling economies of scale 
for generation.31 But the recent proliferation of solar, wind, and other renewables, 
the ever growing importance of customer-sited demand response technology, and 
the ongoing electrification of the transport sector call into question the continued 
merit of, and need for, a centralized, unidirectional grid.  
The economies of scale that justify the construction and aggregation of coal, 
nuclear, and other conventional power plants, of ever greater capacity, in a 
concentrated geographic area do not apply to the same extent to new utility-scale 
renewable or smaller-scale distributed generation facilities. Unlike conventional 
power plants, most renewable power generation assets do not require constant 
supply with fuel and water for cooling, eliminating the need for costly pipeline, 
railroad, and other infrastructure investments.32 Similarly, while utility-scale 
projects benefit from smaller overhead costs relative to their output, the modular 
design of solar and wind farms that combine a large number of individual solar 
panels and wind turbines means that their overall generating efficiency does not 
increase along with their cumulative capacity.33 Unlike traditional thermal power 
																																																								
30 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity 
Grid, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 83 (2017).  
31 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 
MD. L. REV. 773, 791 (2013). 
32 Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/public-benefits-of-renewable-
power#.WbgHe8iGPD4 [https://perma.cc/6CKX-FR7Z] (last updated Apr. 8, 2013). One 
notable exception to the general fuel independence of renewables are biomass generation 
facilities that require delivery of woodchips, feedstock, and other biomaterials for 
combustion. Id.  
33 See, e.g., Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 3, at 923. 
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plants that often emit a series of air pollutants,34 renewable generators cause little, if 
any,35 pollution allowing them to be sited closer to consumers.  
Promoting DERs offers a variety of benefits.36 Closer geographic proximity 
between generation and consumption eliminates the need for new transmission and 
alleviates congestion issues in the increasingly outdated and, hence, often undersized 
existing transmission system.37 Already, pioneering utilities are embracing 
distributed generation as an opportunity to avoid traditional investments in 
distribution infrastructure by calling upon the marketplace to supply alternatives in 
lieu of wire upgrades and expansions.38 In addition, distributed generation has the 
potential to greatly improve the electric grid’s reliability and resilience by reducing, 
for example, the vulnerability to isolated terrorist attacks on individual power plants 
or the risk of cascading brownouts and blackouts.39  
Demand response, once a little known niche player, has entered the mainstream 
with broader scope and more sophisticated applications.40 In 2016, the Supreme 
Court clarified the obligation of electricity wholesale market operators to price and 
treat it the same as traditional generation assets bidding into the market.41 																																																								
34 Kyle Siler-Evans et al., Regional Variations in the Health, Environmental, and 
Climate Benefits of Wind and Solar Generation, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11768, 11768 
(2013); Jonathan Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions from Older 
Power Plants, 9 RISK IN PERSP. 1, 2–4 (2001). 
35 But see Bent Ole Gram Mortenson, International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 179, 189 (2008) (discussing potential nuisances from wind 
turbines, such as noise, vibrations, shadows, and reflections created by rotor blades).  
36 This proposition is discussed in many books, reports and articles, a snapshot of which 
include: Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1655; Garrick B. Pursley & 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 897 (2011); Sara C. Bronin, Curbing 
Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 561 (2010); Joel B. Eisen, Can 
Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The Case For Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 53–55 (2010) [hereinafter Eisen, “Disruptive” Technology?]. 
37 Eisen, “Disruptive” Technology?, supra note 36, at 55; Mormann, Clean Energy 
Federalism, supra note 5, at 1655. The grid’s aging exacerbates this; the American Society 
of Civil Engineers has given the grid a grade of “D+” for years and has reported on a massive 
multibillion dollar investment needed to overhaul it, notwithstanding recent investments in 
digitization. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGRS., FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 4 (2011). 
38 Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: Market Pathways and 
Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 420 (2017) [hereinafter 
Eisen, Modern Electric Grid] (discussing one example, the “Neighborhood Program,” in 
which the New York utility Consolidated Edison is using non-wires alternatives to put off 
having to build new distribution system infrastructure). 
39 David M. Sweet, The Decentralized Energy Paradigm, in ENERGY SECURITY 
CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 308, 312–15 (2009). 
40 See, e.g., Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 372 (describing DR’s history 
since the 1970s and showing that until recently there was little market penetration). 
41 F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016); see generally Joel 
B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. F. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC v. EPSA] (discussing Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n).  
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Guaranteed and nondiscriminatory access to competitive wholesale markets is 
expected to boost this fast growing sector.42 Similarly, storage of electricity has 
evolved from a niche product to a core component of any strategy to encourage more 
renewable energy.43 Recognizing these developments, the term “distributed energy 
resources” is increasingly used to collectively represent distributed generation, 
demand response, storage, and other alternatives to traditional generation that are 
proliferating today.  
The electric grid’s current architecture, dating in many places back to the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, is poorly adapted to accommodate and 
harness the benefits of these innovations. Until now, grid controls have generally 
assumed a unidirectional flow of electricity: starting with utilities that develop 
central power stations and generate electricity for sale and delivery to customers. By 
contrast, customers, not utilities, own most DERs, and there is little centralized 
utility control over them and no rules pertaining to multidirectional interaction. It is 
no coincidence that analysts often refer to the buildout of DERs as occurring “at the 
edge of the grid.”44 This choice of terminology is revealing in multiple ways. For 
starters, it highlights the limited visibility and control of operators over these grid 
assets. For example, they might not know the exact capacity of residential solar 
installations or their precise orientation; both of which impact the delicate, 
instantaneous balance between the supply and demand of electric energy required to 
maintain a stable electric grid.45  
The “edge of the grid” taxonomy is also a reminder of the marginal role that 
ratepayers have played since the beginning of the nation’s electrification—a role 
limited to consumption of electricity often delivered by a monopoly-protected utility 
company with nonnegotiable terms of service. Not until the 1990s did restructuring 
set the stage for competition among load serving entities offering ratepayers a choice 
among multiple suppliers and service plans.46 Even today, however, only sixteen 
states offer retail choice to their ratepayers, leaving the majority of U.S. electricity 
end users beholden to their local utility company.47  																																																								
42 Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 421–22; Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 
S. Ct. at 782–83.   
43 Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy 
Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 725–26 (2014).  
44 See Roberts, supra note 9. 
45 The challenge of balancing increasing amounts of DERs with other resources has 
been vividly illustrated in an illustration known as the “duck chart,” for its unusual shape. 
See CALIFORNIA INDEP. SYS. OP., WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT MANAGING A 
GREEN GRID 2–3 (2016), http://www.caiso.com/documents/flexibleresourceshelprenewable 
s_fastfacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4BN-6JB]. 
46 Mathew J. Morey et al., Retail Choice in Electricity: What Have We Learned in 20 
Years?, CHRISTENSEN ASSOC. ENERGY CONSULTING LLC 5 fig. 2 (2016). 
47 While many residential consumers have switched electricity providers, switching 
rates are still less than 50% in most states. Morey et al., supra note 46, at 5; Christina 
Simeone & John Hanger, Kleinman, A Case Study of Electric Competition Results in 
Pennsylvania, CTR. FOR ENERGY POL’Y 4 (2016). (switching rates of 22–46% for load 
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Notwithstanding limitations in scope and availability, retail choice is critically 
important as the only competitive environment of any sort for the vast majority of 
residential consumers purchasing electricity.48 To be sure, a few pioneering 
customers turned “prosumers” already participate in electricity markets, such as 
those providing demand response.49 Others use net energy metering and similar 
programs to revise the electric grid’s unidirectional narrative.50 Such entrepreneurial 
ratepayers, however, make up a tiny fraction of total residential consumers; and a 
growing, but still minor fraction, of commercial and industrial users. Historically, 
large-scale commercial and industrial customers have had greater economic 
leverage to negotiate and enter into advantageous contracts for purchasing power 
from their utilities, but these customers, too, have little ability to sell power to 
anyone but their local utility.  
 
2.  The Rationale for Free Trade in Electricity 
 
The advantages of a system of free electricity trading are diverse and 
numerous.51 This Article highlights the economic and grid management benefits. 
From an economic perspective, an electricity trading ecosystem allows for proper 
recognition and, ultimately, monetization of the electricity products and services that 
DERs provide to the grid—with inadequate, if any, reward offered under the current 
system. The second justification flows from acknowledging that the centralized 
control architecture of today’s grid is unable to manage DERs. As these distributed 
resources continue to proliferate, the grid requires an increasingly inclusive control 
paradigm built with economic incentives for those who construct, upgrade, own, and 




serving utilities in Pennsylvania). But see Mormann et al., supra note 25, at 67 (reporting 
switching rates of over 90% among Texas retail customers).  
48 Studies differ on retail choice’s impacts on electricity rates. Compare SIMEONE & 
HANGER, supra note 47 (saying prices decreased in Pennsylvania by 2–4% or more) with 
Seth Blumsack et al., Electricity Prices and Costs Under Regulation and Restructuring, 
ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION INDUSTRY STUDIES 1 (2008) http://web.mit.edu/is08/pdf/ 
Blumsack_Lave_Apt%20Sloan%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/54GY-TP6A] (saying prices 
have increased on average by 2–3 cents per kWh). In any event, because retail choice 
fundamentally differs from the system in mind, these studies are less relevant to a system of 
free and multidimensional trade in electricity.    
49 Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 426; Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy 
Prosumer, 43 ECOL. L.Q. 519, 523 (2017). 
50 Revesz & Unel, supra note 30, at 67; Lincoln L. Davies & Sanya Carley, Emerging 
Shadows in National Solar Policy? Nevada’s Net Metering Transition in Context, 30 
ELECTRICITY J. 33 (Jan.-Feb. 2017).  
51 See generally GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11.  
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(a)  Proper Valuation and Remuneration for Grid Assets 
 
The new trading paradigm offers opportunities for utilities and third parties to 
provide value-added services to customers and extend their business models beyond 
the one-way provision of electricity that dominates today’s grid. Free trade for 
electricity can support transactions among a wide variety of participants including 
individuals, utilities, energy service companies (“ESCOs”), aggregators, and others 
that can bundle and market electricity and related product offerings, such as energy 
management services (including energy efficiency measures such as energy audits, 
retrofits, and related services, and utility sponsored demand response). There are 
substantial opportunities to use markets to capture value for participants with a 
widely expanded menu of products and services, including those currently offered 
by utilities and third parties plus experimental new offerings. New firms could enter 
the industry and provide products and services.52 Innovators could develop discrete 
applications, or bring together various functions in complementary ways,53 creating 
synergies by bundling services and products. 
To illustrate the plethora of possibilities, this section describes a nonexclusive 
listing of three categories of business opportunities with the caveat that trading 
structures will enable the development and deployment of even more innovative 
business practices and opportunities over time. The first category includes 
traditional staples of the electricity industry value chain, such as ownership and 
operation of generating facilities, the sale of electricity and the provision of demand-
side energy management services. Incumbent utilities currently dominate this 
category along with more recent market entries by merchant generators, wholesale 
trading firms, and other third parties like demand response firms.54  
The second category includes products and services that capitalize directly on 
information derived in the context of electricity generation and delivery. The data 
generated by smart meters, for example, can yield insights in energy efficiency and 
other metrics that have monetary value.55 Some offerings, such as providing energy 
trading services for participants in markets, are integrally tied to the purchase and 																																																								
52 Utility of the Future: An MIT Energy Initiative Response to an Industry in Transition, 
MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE 186 (2016), [hereinafter MIT Energy Initiative] 
https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Utility-of-the-Future-Full-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C5U2-ZRSP]. For illustrative examples, see Navigating the Energy 
Transformation, NAVIGANT 9 (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.navigant.com/-/media/www/ 
site/insights/energy/2016/navigatingtheenergytransformation.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2G2-
JGEZ]. 
53 Navigating the Energy Transformation, supra note 52, at 14 (“As connected devices, 
DER, intelligent buildings, and prosumers proliferate across the edge of the grid, it is only a 
matter of time before an innovator leveraging ubiquitous digital connectivity, data 
aggregation, and information exchange establishes itself within the industry.”). 
54 Id. 
55 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Remaking Energy: The Critical Role of 
Energy Consumption Data, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1095, 1110–11 (2016); Eisen, Smart 
Regulation, supra note 7, at 12. 
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sale of electricity.56 Others, such as energy efficiency measures, enhanced electric 
vehicle charging, or energy equipment maintenance and financing are made possible 
by capitalizing on information derived from its use.  
Finally, a third category includes non-energy products such as security services 
or home automation that could complement energy-related products or services. 
Some utilities already offer products and services in the second and third categories, 
under terms and conditions regulated by public utility commissions (“PUCs”) and, 
in some instances, FERC.57 And nonutility firms are increasingly vying to capitalize 
on these value streams, by aggregating one or more of them, or even inventing new 
products and services.58 
At present, firms other than utilities face barriers to the free exchange of their 
goods and services. DER owners, for example, have limited opportunities to sell 
electricity to third parties, while utilities can freely access markets and engage in 
bilateral transactions when necessary to supplement market transactions.59 
Nonutility firms are further disadvantaged by information asymmetries, as utilities 
possess far greater knowledge about the actual costs and benefits of generating and 
selling electricity from DERs than most of their customers.60 In light of these 
informational disadvantages and other transaction costs, many would-be-sellers lack 
the sophistication and inclination to deal with existing markets.61  																																																								
56 Numerous firms already engage in electricity trading for utilities and others, 
including subsidiaries of large investor owned utilities, affiliates of merchant generation 
firms, and others. See, e.g., VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY ELECTRONIC DATA 
INTERCHANGE (EDI), TRADING PARTNER AGREEMENT (May 5, 2010) https://www.dominion 
energy.com/library/domcom/pdfs/business/csp-trading-partner-agreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z54L-GQX5]. 
57 An example of FERC’s involvement in the second category is its oversight of market-
based rates for entities trading in electric power, which focuses on whether sellers possess 
market power. Electric Market-Based Rates, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/mbr.asp [https://perma.cc/LPN7-MC7K] 
(last updated Sept. 28, 2017).  
58 See, e.g., MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 32; RICHARD TABORS ET AL., 
WHITE PAPER ON DEVELOPING COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND PRICING 
STRUCTURES ES-1–ES-3 (2016), https://www.bu.edu/pcms/caramanis/NYPSC%20TCR% 
20WhitepaperApril2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C59-JJXP] (discussing opportunities in 
distribution-level markets). 
59 TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at ES-6. 
60 Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and Implementation Plan, Case No. 
14-M-0101: REV (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter New York PSC Track One Framework Order] 
(quoting Jean Tirole, Market Failures and Public Policy, Nobel Prize Lecture, Dec. 8, 2014). 
61 Some potential participants with electricity available in sufficient quantities are 
disinclined to become involved with the wholesale markets due to the complexity and 
transaction costs. For example, municipal wastewater treatment facilities can produce 
electricity from methane generated in the treatment process. Peter Fairley, Power to the 
People, MIT TECH. REV. (May 1, 2001), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400982/ 
power-to-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/F793-SC6K]. WATER RES. FDN., ENERGY PROJECTS 
AT WATER RESOURCE AND RECLAMATION FACILITIES (forthcoming) (detailing the 
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Energy efficiency and other demand-side measures can dramatically reduce 
power plant emissions at low cost, but most of that potential has yet to be realized.62 
Energy service firms work to help customers achieve load reductions, but have not 
captured the full range of available savings. For decades, they have struggled to 
overcome market barriers relating to customer acquisition, technology integration, 
scaling operations beyond individual customers, financing, and behavioral 
challenges.63 In addition, state regulatory approaches often discourage investments 
in demand-side measures,64 even though they are more cost efficient and less risky 
than constructing new power plants.65 Properly designed markets can lower these 
barriers by providing new opportunities for firms to connect with potential 
customers. 
Transparent markets that level the playing field between utility and nonutility 
actors form the backbone of this power trading paradigm, giving buyers and sellers 
the opportunity to offer valuable grid products and services in return for monetary 
incentives. In simplest terms, fully functional markets can price all aspects of 
generating, transporting, and consuming power across the system while maintaining, 
protecting, and optimizing the delivery and consumption of electricity, and 
deploying DERs as critical elements of the grid. From a microeconomic perspective, 
market price signals can be the principal driver of determining how participants 
derive economic value from transactions, and encouraging further industry 
development.  
Such a market-based trading ecosystem requires an architecture that encourages 
recognition and optimization of all possible value streams, outlines the business 
opportunities for participants, and spells out the interaction among all parties. This 
structure would differ from the current grid’s limited markets in three fundamental 
ways. First, it would encourage participation by a broad spectrum of actors, 
including individual buyers and sellers as well as a range of new and existing firms. 
Second, it would expand the portfolio of products and services traded on markets to 
include innovative offerings. Finally, it would expand the types of transactions 
beyond the limited set currently available.    
																																																								
reluctance of these facilities to navigate the complex requirements for wholesale market 
trading.). 
62 Jim Lazar & Ken Colburn, Recognizing the Full Value of Energy Efficiency, REG. 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.raponline.org/knowledge-
center/recognizing-the-full-value-of-energy-efficiency/ [https://perma.cc/D2S9-DBMD].  
63 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 25; Victor M. Hanna, Stop, 
Think, Build, Repeat: Using Behavioral Economics to Better Design Energy Efficiency 
Policies for Our Cities’ Buildings, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 241, 289–90 (2014). 
64 Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 369–71 (describing the “throughput 
incentive” and its impact on discouraging demand-side investments). 
65 How Much Does Energy Efficiency Cost?, AM. COUN. FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT 
ECON. 1, http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/cost-of-ee.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7QS-A38Y] 
(finding that energy efficiency program costs are “substantially less than the cost of meeting 
electricity needs with new power plants”). 
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This framework contemplates an increasingly decentralized siting of grid 
assets. Economists studying industrial organization increasingly suggest that the 
innovative characteristics of DERs change the size and location of optimal firms in 
the electricity sector.66 Thus, the proliferation of DERs along the edge of the grid 
allows their owners to emancipate themselves somewhat from the stranglehold of 
local utilities.67 The operational characteristics of DERs, particularly the opportunity 
for multidirectional interaction among actors through the use of digital 
communications technologies, reduce transaction costs and create economies of 
scale that decrease the economic incentives for vertical integration.68 As the 
proliferation of markets lowers transaction costs, “transactive activity should shift 
at the margin from within firm to between firm, and firm boundaries should 
change.”69 
 
(b)  A More Inclusive Control Paradigm 
 
DER growth is challenging the widespread assumption that the centralized 
system of physically managing the grid is necessary and sufficient to maintain grid 
stability and reliability. “Edge of the grid” sounds like a frontier without concrete 
rules of interaction. To a large extent, it is. But the “edge” marks no fixed boundary, 
and not all DERs are located at the grid’s outermost points. The growing penetration 
of DERs fosters both increasing two-way communication, and nonlinear interactions 
among devices.70 As DERs become more interconnected to the grid, they need to be 
considered integral and interactive parts of it. Yet, utility control systems 
accustomed to unidirectional flow of electricity tend to treat them more like 
appendices.  
Control systems originally designed for one-way flow are not up to the task of 
incorporating DERs and maintaining stable grid operations. Already, there are too 
many DERs online, acting too quickly for real-time management to be possible in 
most instances.71 The rapid deployment of DERs will exacerbate this, and soon, 
devices at the grid’s edge will overwhelm the distribution system’s ability to manage 
them.72 																																																								
66 Kiesling, supra note 11. 
67 Most owners of DERs continue to rely on the electric grid and utility supplied power 
when their in house generation is insufficient to meet their electricity needs. See Revesz & 
Unel, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that “distributed solar customers may depend on utility 
supplied power to supplement or meet their usage sixteen hours a day”). 
68 Kiesling, supra note 11, at 8. 
69 Id. at 22.  
70 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 5. 
71 Id. at iii. 
72 By one estimate, this would happen once DERs make up 30% of total grid capacity. 
Id. (at this point “the current control systems for the grid will be simply inadequate”). For an 
individual utility’s perspective, see The Emerging Clean Energy Economy, SO. CALIF. 
EDISON (Sept. 2016), http://www.edison.com/content/dam/eix/documents/our-
perspective/der-dso-white-paper-final-201609.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GWY-X6DL].  
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There must be some other means of managing a grid comprised of both 
traditional generation and DERs. Therefore, an electricity trading ecosystem must 
not only establish the economic foundation of markets in goods and services, but 
must also carefully specify the technical details of the interaction among parties. 
This Article proposes a new operational paradigm for grid control in which multiple 
parties—generators, markets, DER owners, and aggregators, as well as grid 
operators—engage in discovery and management of grid devices.73 The 
convergence of expanded data management capabilities, sophisticated analytic 
models, cloud computing, and ubiquitous connectivity can accelerate the 
development of this infrastructure. In particular, technologies and standards 
currently under development to facilitate multi-device, multi-party data exchange 
make it possible to contemplate distributed physical balancing and control, rather 
than centralized utility control.  
In the near future, society could see a grid that eschews fully centralized control 
for “a loosely coupled set of controls with just enough information exchange to allow 
for stability and global optimization through local action.”74 This more distributed 
approach, which folds the combination of grid economics and grid controls into an 
engineering and economics framework, is one of the hallmarks of this framework, 
combined with regulatory models, discussed below, that are tailored to the locus of 
innovation to the greatest extent possible. 
 
B.  Core Interactions in an Electricity Trading Ecosystem 
 
A fully developed electricity trading ecosystem should enable a wide range of 
energy-related trades and transactions among a large and diverse set of actors. For a 
better structural understanding, the various transactions are classified based on the 
products and services traded, the parties involved, and the types of transactions. In 
addition to its taxonomic value, this tripartite classification serves as the backdrop 
for identifying crucial questions that need to be addressed before the current utility 
centric electricity system can make way for the future. 
The term “markets” is used to describe three different aspects of the ecosystem: 
the regional wholesale electricity markets, which this proposal retains; the new state 
markets, which would facilitate many interactions that are expected to take place; 
and the overall character of the ecosystem as market-based. With that understanding 
in mind, the next section now turns to describing the products and services, actors, 
and transactions that constitute this electricity trading ecosystem. 																																																								
73 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 8–9 (contemplating a “more 
distributed kind of control” over the electric grid, providing a map of distributed system 
control using DERs and other resources, calling it “joint market and control functionality.”). 
Compare LORENZO KRISTOV & PAUL DEMARTINI, CALTECH RESNICK INST., 21ST CENTURY 
ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OPERATIONS 1 (May 2014), http://resnick.caltech.edu/docs 
/21st.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV8C-9BAH]. (describing an “integrated distributed electricity 
system” where “energy sources and operating decisions will be broadly decentralized and 
localized”); MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 35. 
74 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 10. 
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1.  Products and Services 
 
No listing of products and services would be complete without reference to 
existing regional wholesale markets.75 In these markets, energy-related products and 
services are traded in many different ways. In its most traditional form, electric 
energy is bought and sold in kWh or MWh, i.e., as a function of electrical output or 
consumption over a specified period of time.76 Electricity is often traded in forward 
transactions, with generators offering to supply electricity for intervals of five 
minutes or longer on a day ahead basis.77 If all goes as planned, on the following 
day, the generator delivers the promised amount of electricity as contracted for the 
day before. If the generator fails to deliver as promised, it has to compensate its 
counterparty based on their imbalance settlement for the balancing services required 
to make up for its shortfall.78 These balancing services differ from the default energy 
product by virtue of their short-term availability.79 
Maintaining the electric grid’s delicate balance requires the continuous 
matching of fluctuating demand with corresponding supply and frequent 
interventions to maintain voltage and frequency within a specified range.80 Voltage 
and frequency regulation are examples of “ancillary services” already traded in 
wholesale markets to ensure the grid’s stability and compatibility with appliances 
and other load off-takers.  
More recently, concerns over sufficient reserve capacity to meet demand spikes 
in summer heat spells and other extreme weather events have prompted parts of the 
country to also trade energy by “capacity.”81 Here, parties do not (yet) contract for 
all or part of the electricity to be generated by one, or multiple, power plant(s) of a 
certain capacity. Instead, generators are remunerated for ensuring the availability of 
a certain output capacity for a set future period of time—the energy economy’s 
equivalent of a retainer fee for attorneys.82 
																																																								
75 Hammond & Spence, supra note 24. See also Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 
136 S. Ct. 1288, 1290–93 (2016) (describing the clearing process for bids into the wholesale 
market of the PJM interconnect). 
76 Electric Power Annual 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCV9-8HS4]. 
77 Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1656. Cf. Corinna Klessmann 
et al., Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks—A Comparison of 
the Market Integration Approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3646, 
3647 (2008) (discussing market risks of renewable energy producers in Germany, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom). 
78 Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 3, at 923.  
79 Id. 
80 Klessman et al., supra note 77, at 3647 (“The power system can only function in a 
stable manner if supply and demand are continuously balanced.”). 
81 See, e.g., Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. 
POL’Y 47, 64 (2013).  
82 Rossi, supra note 15, at 424 n.145. 
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Thus, wholesale markets across the nation differ both in terms of the products 
traded—capacity vs. electric energy vs. ancillary services—and in their temporal 
dimension—forward vs. spot markets. Whatever their product and timeline, these 
markets use standardized terms and conditions for all but the price which markets 
set as a function of demand and supply.83 The new power trading paradigm should 
offer a framework for the continued provision of these energy-related products and 
services, individually or in whatever combination most appeals to the specific 
markets and their participants.  
Going forward, the same framework can accommodate and foster the creation 
of novel markets for products and services previously not contemplated or 
technologically available, while also lowering barriers for new entrants into existing 
markets. Already, energy conservation and efficiency play a limited role in markets 
(occasionally providing ancillary services), as some pioneering jurisdictions begin 
to harness the power of aggregating intermittent renewable generators to offer higher 
value balancing services as opposed to, or in addition to, standard electricity sales.84 
Similarly, recent advances in batteries and other energy storage technologies have 
made it possible for these facilities to provide both energy and ancillary services.85 
 
2.  Actors 
 
The new power trading paradigm builds on continued participation of the actors 
that shape today’s energy system, including electric utilities, merchant generators, 
grid operators, and large-scale industrial and commercial customers. While these 
constituencies should and will remain involved in an electricity trading ecosystem, 
their relative importance may change. 
Utilities will likely become less dominant than they are today.86 Regardless of 
whether it is investor owned, municipally owned, or a rural electric cooperative, the 
utility of the future will cease to be the central hub of the electricity sector. Instead, 
nonutility actors—both old and new—will move closer to center stage. Merchant 
																																																								
83 See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1288 (2016). 
84 See John Moore, Energy Efficiency: Opportunities in FERC-Regulated Markets, 
SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT (Jan. 14, 2014), http://mwalliance.org/conference/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/MES_2014_presentations_Moore.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN42-GBEK]; see 
also Eric Winkler, Energy Efficiency in ISO New England Capacity Markets, ACEEE 
INTELLIGENT EFFICIENCY CONFERENCE (Dec. 7, 2015), http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/ 
pdf/conferences/ie/2015/Session3A-Winkler-IE15-12.7.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TGM-
6CMP] (discussing one RTO’s experience); Mormann et al., supra note 25, at 89–90 
(describing the case of Germany’s Next Kraftwerke—a virtual power plant that combines 
570 MW of solar, wind, biomass, and other renewable generation capacity to bid 170 MW 
of fast ramping, partly instantaneous backup capacity into Germany’s balancing market). 
85 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 43, at 707–08. 
86 See infra Section IV.C. 
70 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
	
generators87 will continue to gain influence as the number of potential buyers for 
their output and available transaction formats increase. Aggregators and brokers of 
DERs will harness the multiplicity of new sales and distribution channels to assume 
a greater role.88 As guardians of the grid, ISOs and RTOs are also likely to see their 
mandates and responsibilities grow in scope and complexity.89 ESCOs and other 
service providers would become more important market participants. Finally, 
energy-intensive industrial and commercial electricity customers who already use 
their financial and business acumen to negotiate their own rates and other terms for 
electricity and related services will experience an upgrade to their market position 
and options.90 
Perhaps the most transformative impact of free trade in electricity, however, 
will be the introduction of new classes and empowerment of previously 
marginalized classes of actors through enhanced market access. Thus, households 
with rooftop solar will no longer be required to sell or net meter their output to their 
local utility based on take-it-or-leave-it rates and terms. Instead, these prosumers 
will now have the ability, subject to certain technical constraints,91 to choose from 
among a variety of competing buyers and transaction formats. Even traditional 
consumers of electricity, without their own generation capacity, can participate in 
markets that support a range of competing business models. These could include 
emerging but not yet fully deployed time-of-use pricing models, energy 
management services, or prepaid plans that allow ratepayers to lock in a specific rate 
but offer the potential for resale of any surplus, similar to the “rollover” minutes 
offered under cellphone plans.92  
Finally, the new wealth of actors and transactions will likely attract more and 
more energy traders. Their notorious role in the California energy crisis underscores 
the need for a proactively developed regulatory regime that guides the transition to 
the future and avoids the market manipulation and other mistakes that have marred 
and, in many places, stalled restructuring of the electricity sector.93 
 
																																																								
87 In the industry, these firms are also known as independent power producers (“IPPs”). 
See STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES: MARKETS AND 
POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 89–93 (2015).   
88 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 209–14 (discussing in depth the 
effects DERs on networks). 
89 Geographic scale requirements may result in consolidation of ISOs and RTOs. See 
Regional Energy Market, CAL. INDEP. SYS. OP., http://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/ 
RegionalEnergyMarket.aspx [https://perma.cc/V7LQ-TQTE] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) 
(discussing developments in proposed expansion of California ISO). 
90 See TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at 74. 
91 See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
92 See, e.g., About Rollover Minutes, AT&T, https://www.att.com/esupport/article.htm 
l#!/wireless/KM1051496 [https://perma.cc/J8G9-79UC] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
93 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER WEARE, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: CAUSES AND 
POLICY OPTIONS 28–30 (2003).  
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3.  Transactions 
 
The multiplicity of transactions can be separated into four categories depending 
on the extent to which either or both of the parties to a specific transaction is 
principally involved in the business of making and selling electricity or related 
products and services. These transactions are categorized by the character of their 
origination and destination, regardless of any intermediate steps necessary to 
consummate them, such as the operation of a market. The first category, termed 
“business to business” (“B2B”) involves transactions where both parties are 
professional buyers and sellers. An example would be the sale of electricity from a 
merchant generator to an electric utility. A second category, “business to consumer” 
(“B2C”), refers to transactions where a professional firm sells to end users, such as 
the sale of electricity by a utility to its customers. The third category, “consumer to 
business” (“C2B”), includes sales from consumers94 to professional firms. An 
example of a C2B transaction would be a homeowner selling the excess output of 
her rooftop solar installation to the local utility.95 Finally, the Article envisions a 
category of interaction heretofore unknown, “consumer to consumer” (“C2C”), that 
involves transactions between nonprofessional sellers and buyers of electricity and 
related services. A typical C2C transaction would be the sale of rooftop solar 
generated electricity from one neighbor to another. 
Classifying a transaction as B2B, B2C, C2B, or C2C matters for a variety of 
reasons, including the applicable contractual regime. A C2C transaction would 
likely be governed by common law principles, but some courts would apply the 
Uniform Commercial Code to B2B, B2C, and C2B transactions.96 The various types 
of transactions also differ markedly in their availability, structure, and access to 
competitive markets. At one end of the spectrum, B2B trades have a long history 
and are well established both in the form of bilateral contracts and, more recently, 
as the result of competitive bidding processes on wholesale power markets. At the 
other end of the spectrum, C2C transactions are virtually nonexistent, lacking both 
																																																								
94 The authors reemphasize that a “consumer” seller in a C2B or C2C transaction is a 
“prosumer.” See Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 425 and accompanying text. 
“Consumer” is used here for simplicity’s sake. 
95 This could be effectuated through one of several different means, including a feed-in 
tariff (set price for power sold to the grid) or net metering. See Mormann, Clean Energy 
Federalism, supra note 5, at 1630. 
96 Courts are split on the issue of whether electricity constitutes a movable thing or a 
good under UCC § 2-102. For courts in favor of application of the UCC to sales of electricity, 
see, e.g., In re Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., No. C 02-3464, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22023 
(September 30, 2004); Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 271 B.R. 626, 
638–40 (N.D. Cal. 2002). For examples of courts finding sales of electricity do not fall under 
the UCC, see, e.g., Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 183 A.D.2d 293, 296–97 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992); G&K Dairy v. Princeton Electric Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485, 490 (W.D. 
Ky. 1991); Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., 558 A.2d 419, 470–72 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1989).  
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an established regime of bilateral contracts and, critically, access to competitive 
market platforms. 
Free trade in electricity would encompass a greatly expanded range of 
transactions—both on markets and in bilateral trading constellations that would 
cease to be the exclusive domain of B2B transactions. In addition, it would facilitate 
a much wider variety of B2B, B2C, and C2C transactions in electricity and related 
products and services such as energy management. And this section contemplates a 
multitude of virtual transactions related to electricity, such as put or call options to 
hedge against the risk of unusual price fluctuations. 
 
(a)  B2B Transactions 
 
In the early days of electrification, B2B transactions were few and far between. 
Electricity providers were vertically integrated—selling and delivering the power 
they generated to customers using their own, often insular distribution networks.97 
When these networks eventually merged to form larger interconnects, utilities were 
able to use this transmission infrastructure to buy power from one another. The 
industry’s vertical integration and prevailing cost-of-service regulation,98 however, 
limited such B2B transactions to rare instances where one utility turned to another 
to meet unusually high demand from its customers.99 
Even after enactment of the 1935 Federal Power Act (“FPA”), B2B trades of 
electricity remained relatively uncommon, and limited to bilateral contracts between 
utilities.100 B2B transactions with nonutility participation did not take off until the 
1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) opened the door for a new 
class of merchant generators101 by exempting them from burdensome utility 
regulation while requiring local utilities to purchase their power output.102 Finally, 
the greatest catalyst of B2B transactions in the electricity sector came in the form of 
a series of rulemaking initiatives by FERC that resulted in the creation of wholesale 
																																																								
97 See JAMES TREFIL, A SCIENTIST IN THE CITY 98–101 (1995). 
98 ISSER, supra note 87, at 20–35 (discussing the emergence of vertical integration and 
prevailing cost of service regulation industry features). 
99 David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy 
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 146 (2012). 
100 Id. at 154. 
101 Hammond & Spence, supra note 24, at 151 (describing the rise of merchant 
generators and QF requirements). 
102 ISSER, supra note 87, at 35. 
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power markets.103 While bilateral contracts continue to play an important role,104 
competitive wholesale markets have replaced FERC regulation of individual 
transactions as the norm in two-thirds of the United States.105 This new power 
trading paradigm builds on and expands the role of competitive wholesale markets 
by inviting trade of novel products among new market entrants, such as the 
renewable power offered by DER aggregators. 
 
(b)  B2C Transactions 
 
Today, the quintessential B2C transaction is a load-serving utility’s sale of 
electricity to its customers, regulated for nearly a century by state PUCs.106 These 
transactions are executed through bilateral contracts, even where ratepayers have a 
choice among various retail electricity providers. Growing competition among 
retailers in parts of the country has increased both the number and nature of customer 
options. But pricing and other terms remain subject to generally non-negotiable, 																																																								
103 Three major FERC Orders—Order 888, Order 889, and Order 2000—catalyzed this 
transformation. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by 
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540-01 (May 10, 1996), (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385); (Order 888) Open-Access Same-Time Information 
System (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 12484-01 (Mar. 14, 1997) (to be codified at18 C.F.R. pt. 37 (1996) (Order 889)). 
Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2000) (Order 
2000). See ISSER, supra note 87, at 138–45 (describing the emergence of FERC Orders 888 
and 889); Hammond & Spence, supra note 24, at 151–52; Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory 
Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility 
Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 550 (2005). 
104 See Energy Policy Group, LLC, Competition in Bilateral Wholesale Electric 
Markets: How Does It Work?, ELECTRIC MRKT. RES. FOUND. 3 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2016/Bilateral%20Markets%20White%20Paper
%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAB8-RASV]. See also Mormann et al., supra note 25, at 
66 (noting that more than 90% of load in California and Texas is served based on bilateral 
contracts). 
105 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 24, at 156, 206. The overall footprint of 
wholesale markets continues to expand, as more utilities consider joining ISOs and RTOs. 
See, e.g., Robert Mullin, Mountain West to Explore Joining SPP, RTO INSIDER (Jan. 8, 
2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/spp-mountain-west-36468/ [https://perma.cc/WDF5-
CRSW] (highlighting discussions by utilities in Colorado, Wyoming and other Western 
states to join SPP). This trend, however, has met with pushback in states concerned over the 
continuing profitability and financial viability of electric utilities in a market driven 
environment, prompting proposals for re-integrating utilities. See, e.g., Gavin Bade, Re-
regulation on the Horizon? State Plant Subsidies Point to Looming ‘Crisis’ in Organized 
Power Markets, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/re-
regulation-vertically-integrated-utility/428639/ [https://perma.cc/53CW-2PM9] (discussing 
proposals underway in Ohio and Michigan). 
106 See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1614, 1629–30 (2014) (describing the origins of this system). 
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boilerplate provisions. Even in states with retail choice, B2C transactions today look 
nothing like the B2B transactions on wholesale markets where prices are set by 
demand and supply. Yet, ratepayers with retail choice demonstrate a surprising 
mobility in switching from one retail provider to another, suggesting a level of 
customer engagement sufficient to drive more competitive markets for B2C 
transactions.107 The vision of free trade for electricity would foster the development 
of these markets. 
 
(c)  C2B Transactions 
 
The recent proliferation of smaller-scale, customer-sited distributed generation 
assets has created a new type of transaction where a consumer-turned-prosumer of 
electricity sells the (excess) output of her installation to the local utility. To date, 
such C2B transactions are limited in a number of ways. In most jurisdictions, 
prosumers are at the mercy of a monopsony buyer—their local utility.108 
Furthermore, many jurisdictions structure the C2B relationship using net energy 
metering programs that limit the amount a prosumer can sell.109 While the feed-in 
tariff programs, recently adopted by a few pioneering states and utilities, eliminate 
this cap,110 they too, prevent prosumers from capturing the full value of their output, 
as remuneration rates tend to be flat and not time sensitive. In a 2010 decision, FERC 
endorsed feed-in tariff rates set under PURPA that include adders or bonus payments 
for transmission and distribution upgrade costs that a utility avoids as the result of 
distributed generation assets.111 To date, however, no feed-in tariff (expressly) 
considers and rewards the benefits of DERs related to transmission and distribution 
network congestion relief. 
 
(d)  C2C Transactions 
 
The most novel category of transactions envisioned connects nonprofessional 
buyers and sellers of electricity-related products and services. To date, there is no 
contractual framework or market platform to facilitate C2C transactions such as the 
sale of rooftop solar electricity from one residential ratepayer to another. Yet, such 
local trades offer obvious benefits in terms of providing critical relief to increasingly 																																																								
107 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
108 Net metering is only available to customers of a specific utility, and requires 
customers to sell their power to that utility. See Revesz & Unel, supra note 30, at 60−64 
(describing these and other features of different state net metering programs). 
109 See id. at 46–47; N.C. Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables & Efficiency, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/ [https://perma.cc/KD3K-4H27] 
(last visited July 31, 2017) (collects individual state net metering caps and other limitations). 
110 See Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for 
State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 191 (2017) (describing the 
growing proliferation of state-level feed-in tariffs in the United States). 
111 See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n S. California Edison Co. P. Gas and Electric Co. San 
Diego Gas & Electric Co., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,267 (F.E.R.C. Oct. 21, 2010). 
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congested transmission and distribution networks. As the portfolio of DERs 
continues to grow and diversify, C2C transactions will allow for more efficient siting 
and pooling of resources among nonprofessional but increasingly energy-savvy 
consumers and prosumers of electricity.  
Imagine two neighbors, one with a roof structure and orientation that are 
perfectly suited for solar panels and another whose roof is not solar compatible but 
who has plenty of excess space in her basement. Or think of the California hippie 
who sells battery-stored power produced by his commune’s solar farm out of the 
back of his VW bus at the local farmers’ market. Under the current regime, only the 
latter, outside-the-grid transaction would be possible even though the former 
promises to be more efficient and easier to scale. A well developed framework for 
C2C transactions would allow both homeowners to join forces using the first 
neighbor’s roof to generate solar electricity and the second neighbor’s basement for 
installation of storage batteries. 
 
4.  New State Markets 
 
This Article proposes the establishment of new state-level markets as the 
default venue for C2C transactions. These markets should be structured as 
“platforms,” comparable to those of Uber and Airbnb, which have emerged in a 
variety of industries to match buyers and sellers. Jean Tirole, the founding father of 
platform economics,112 defines a platform as a market where the specific price 
structure presents opportunities to each side of the market to increase overall utility 
and overcome transaction costs.113 Platforms differ from other markets in that they 
provide a place for customers to discover each other and conduct transactions, with 
common ground rules that aim to create network effects by reducing transaction 
costs of interaction and increasing market liquidity.114 Platforms come in various 																																																								
112 For the “seminal” work that “ignited” discussion of multisided markets, see Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. 
ASS’N 990 (2003); DAVID S. EVANS, PLATFORM ECONOMICS: ESSAYS ON MULTI-SIDED 
BUSINESSES vi (2011), http://www.marketplatforms.com/wp-content/uploads/Downloads 
/Platform-Economics-Essays-on-Multi-Sided-Businesses.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBW3-
43UW].   
113 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 
RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 (2006). (stating that pricing’s importance in transactional platforms 
is illustrated by the failures of the business to business exchanges of the dot com boom of 
the early 2000s. Nearly 1,500 exchanges such as VerticalNet and Chemdex sought to match 
buyers and sellers within individual industries, and failed in large part because they were 
auction sites similar to eBay. This signaled low pricing power, among other weaknesses.). 
See EVANS, supra note 112, at 62−63. 
114 See Peter C. Evans & Annabelle Gawer, The Rise of the Platform Enterprise: A 
Global Survey, CTR. FOR GLOB. ENTER. 6 (Jan. 2016), http://www.thecge.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/PDF-WEB-Platform-Survey_01_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/6497-
4VS6]; see Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Opening Platforms: How, When and Why?, in 
PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION 131, 135 (Annabelle Gawer ed., 2009); MIT 
ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 187. 
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shapes and the nature of connections among participants varies widely. Software or 
standards that promote innovation, such as Google’s suite of applications, are one 
version of a platform.115 Transaction platforms—including financial markets, 
auction houses, and other exchanges that reduce the transaction costs of matching 
buyers and sellers—are another.116  
Economists term platforms “multisided” markets117 because they can have 
more than two different types of users,118 and because their users are interdependent. 
In transactional platforms, users make economically advantageous matches with 
each other through mediated trading systems designed to overcome the externalities 
that present barriers to buyers and sellers from discovering and trading with one 
another.119 At times, they may be buyers, and at other times (perhaps even 
overlapping) sellers. Consider the Airbnb participant who owns and rents a property 
in one city but also visits other cities, using Airbnb to rent spaces there. 
Platforms create value for their participants by generating both direct and 
indirect network effects. Direct network effects result from increasing scale: as the 
platform attracts more users, others find the prospect of using it more attractive, 
resulting in a cycle of continuing growth.120 This is a phenomenon well known to 
anyone familiar with Facebook or Twitter, for instance. Indirect network effects 
result where platform users on one side attract more on the other.121 As discussed 
below, design and implementation choices can promote or hinder the ability to 
efficiently match buyers and sellers in the market, and the development of network 
effects.122 
In keeping with the pertinent literature, this Article proposes a specific form of 
transactional platform: electricity exchanges open to new forms of interaction, to 
novel products and services, and to a broad spectrum of new participants. Properly 
designed and implemented, these exchanges could reduce transaction costs and 
catalyze positive externalities, such as more widespread product diffusion and 																																																								
115 See Evans & Gawer, supra note 114, at 7. 
116 Id.; Lynne Kiesling, Platform Economics and “Unscaling” the Electricity Industry, 
KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM (Oct. 16, 2014), https://knowledgeproblem.com/2014/10/16/plat 
form-economics-and-unscaling-the-electricity-industry/ [https://perma.cc/X7Q9-889V].  
117 See EVANS, supra note 112, at vi; Proc. on Mot. of the Commn. in Regard to 
Reforming the Energy Vision., 14-M-0101, at 5 (N.Y.P.S.C. May 19, 2016) [hereinafter New 
York REV Track Two Order]. 
118 “Digital media platforms, for example, often have four: users, developers, hardware 
makers, and content providers.” EVANS, supra note 112, at vi n.4. 
119 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 113, at 649; Eisenmann et al., supra note 114, at 
133. For a suggested use of platforms in the energy industry, see Claire M. Weiller & Michael 
G. Pollitt, Platform Markets and Energy Services, ENERGY POL’Y RES, GROUP (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1334-PDF.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N2WE-RSDH].  
120 See EVANS, supra note 112, at 2. 
121 Id.; David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided 
Platform Businesses 2 (Feb. 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18783 [https://perma.cc/ 
TBW3-43UW].  
122 Infra Part II.B. 
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attendant benefits. Widespread access to platform power markets could, therefore, 
accelerate the deployment of solar power (and help reduce carbon emissions) as well 
as dissemination of energy efficiency products and services. 
Unique characteristics of electricity and the grid make it ripe for a wholesale 
shift to exchanges. Electricity is extremely suitable for trading. Because any unit of 
electricity is indistinguishable from any other, it is possible to accomplish most 
transactions virtually with assumed contractual paths. This fungibility also 
distinguishes electricity from water or spare living space. And settlement could be 
quicker than in auctions where buyers receive physical goods, assuming proper 
measurement and verification protocols for suppliers. Better yet, the platform would 
require no new backbone infrastructure, as one already exists: the physical grid. The 
rapid proliferation of digital technologies, meanwhile, offers support for a large and 
growing number of market interactions. This kind of technology-driven change to 
the industry’s organizational structure has, in fact, been a central aspect of its 
evolution for decades.123 
Setting up these exchanges will be no easy task, given potential (and likely) 
conflicts with the grid’s existing physical and organizational structure, especially 
where incumbent monopoly rights are at stake.124 In the near term, the exchanges 
should be built to latch onto an existing system of generating and distributing 
electricity, with actors who might not support them and will likely use their political 
clout to oppose them. New markets that are developed using existing infrastructure 
and pursuant to existing institutional arrangements further carry the risk that 
impediments from incumbent actors may cause critical linkages to develop in 
suboptimal fashion and require adjustments later. Still, the potential benefits are 
such that they warrant the effort necessary to resolve these and other growing pains 
along the way to free trade for electric power. 
 
II.  DESIGN GOALS AND PRINCIPLES 
 
Having explained the rationale and concept of an ecosystem that facilitates free 
trade for electricity, this Part now turns to fundamental design principles. In light of 
the multitude of vested interests, legacy infrastructure, and deeply entrenched 
incumbents, it would be naïve to presume that the new power trading paradigm can 
start with a clean slate. Fortunately, much progress can be made by combining 
existing facilities and institutions with new legal arrangements. Rather than calling 
for a radical (and unlikely) revolution, this framework represents the next stage of 
evolution for the electricity system put in place well over a century ago. 
  
																																																								
123 See Kiesling, supra note 11, at 8−10. 
124 See Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 3, at 919 (analyzing the barriers 
to entry that protect deeply entrenched incumbents against competition in the electricity 
marketplace). See also infra Part IV.C. 
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This Part specifies a set of foundational principles intended to strike a careful 
balance between encouraging innovation, unlocking free trade for electricity, and 
avoiding substantial near-term disturbances in the industry. It begins with a handful 
of foundational building blocks, followed by a set of more specific design principles 
that shape this framework. 
 
A.  Core Ecosystem Goals 
 
Five core goals advance the concept of free trade in electricity while respecting 
the limitations of today’s system. They are as follows: a competitive trading 
environment with low barriers to entry; an evolutionary, not revolutionary, approach 
to moving toward the future; agnosticism about which business model is most likely 
to achieve full trading; matching the scale and institutional locus of regulation with 
the most meaningful impacts on the electricity sector; and, finally, recognition of 
and sensitivity to shifting jurisdictional boundaries. 
First, a high priority is placed on the overarching goal of promoting 
anywhere/anytime transactions. Any policy that purports to transform the electricity 
industry should be able to answer the following basic questions. How will the policy 
lead to networking? How will it facilitate the cornucopia of transactions that would 
take place in a fully functioning free trade ecosystem? How will it promote 
opportunities for innovators to be part of the ecosystem and create value? How will 
such a policy create access points for consumers that replace today’s often byzantine 
access requirements125 with a more inviting and user-friendly regime?  
Second, implementation of the new power trading paradigm will need to follow 
an evolutionary, not revolutionary, approach.126 Without electricity, modern life 
would be almost impossible. Revamping the grid entirely all at once would have 
numerous implications for security and reliability. Replacing the existing business 
model from one day to the next with an untested model would jeopardize the current 
system’s financial stability. Recent history in the industry also counsels in favor of 
caution. Those who remember how California’s experiment with the CalPX power 
exchange crashed and burned will be wary of turning the distribution system over to 
market forces.127 This approach retains many elements of the existing grid, such as 
the wholesale markets. Evolutionary progress does not require that all policy 
building blocks be developed immediately. Still, some major decisions will need to 
be made in the here and now, and those early decisions will inevitably determine 																																																								
125 See id. at 919–24. (discussing grid access and other requirements for entry to the 
electricity marketplace as impediments that impose a disproportionate burden on solar, wind, 
and other disruptive technologies). 
126 New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision proceeding echoes this sentiment. See 
New York PSC Track One Framework Order, supra note 60, at 39 (stating that, “even with 
regulatory reform, there will be substantial utility investment in conventional rate-based 
infrastructure, and that reform must be carefully modulated to avoid costly and 
counterproductive changes in financial risk.”).   
127 Isser, supra note 87, at 233−74 chronicles this “market meltdown.” 
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much of what will transpire later. Proper implementation, finally, will require 
constant monitoring and, where necessary, retooling of the system as it develops.  
Third, the legal framework underlying the new trading paradigm should 
encourage experimentation within the grid’s physical, legal, and market architecture. 
Rather than pick winners and losers, it is imperative to avoid ex ante decisions about 
which technology or business model will succeed. To facilitate the greatest possible 
range of innovation, market entrants who wish to promote alternatives to incumbent 
utilities should not be unduly hampered in their efforts. To this end, policymakers 
can expand on recent market-building initiatives by FERC and their express 
endorsement by the Supreme Court.128 The optimal way to accommodate these 
competing preferences is to create new opportunities to deliver products and 
services, and to extend equally to all, the means to develop them. Notwithstanding 
the need for and value of such an open-access approach, the new framework must 
also recognize the needs of incumbent utilities and the existing legal mandates that 
affect them. 
Fourth, regulation of innovation at the edge of the grid should correspond to its 
locus to the greatest extent possible. Scale matching has long been a staple of classic 
federalism theory.129 Under this approach, issues of multilevel regulation are 
commonly resolved in favor of whatever level of government is capable of 
internalizing most of the costs and benefits associated with regulatory action.130 
Presumably, superior policies and regulation emerge when decision makers are in a 
position to consider and weigh all relevant costs and benefits.131 Notwithstanding 
the theoretic appeal of classic federalism theory’s approach to multilevel governance 
questions, recent scholarship has raised concerns over the matching principle’s 
ability to accommodate the multitude of costs and benefits inherent in all regulatory 																																																								
128 See Eisen, FERC v. EPSA, supra note 41, at 5. 
129 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498 
(1994) (noting that state regulation has historically been defended as a way of adapting law 
to local conditions and tastes, with national regulation thought necessary to prevent attempts 
by states to impose costs on each other). 
130 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1210, 1222 (1992) (describing the presence of interstate externalities as a “powerful reason 
for intervention at the federal level”); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems 
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 
YALE L.J. 1196, 1215–16 (1977) (discussing various types of spillover effects); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) 
(characterizing transboundary pollution as a “clear case for shifting regulatory authority from 
local to more centralized levels of governance”). 
131 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching 
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996). See also David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism When 
Numbers Matter More Than Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 308 (2014) 
(explaining that “[f]or the classical school, the primary consideration is whether regulatory 
agencies internalize the environmental costs and benefits of their policies.”). 
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action.132 Any regulation triggering even remote effects felt beyond the regulator’s 
jurisdictional reach would, under the traditional scale matching approach, call for 
action by a higher level of government.133  
DERs and other technology innovation at the edge of the grid illustrate the 
dilemma of regulatory scale matching. As more efficient consumption patterns and 
locally generated electricity from solar, wind, and other renewable sources reduce 
the need for carbon intensive fossil-fueled power plants, they help mitigate global 
climate change. Maximum internalization of these benefits would, therefore, suggest 
regulatory action at the highest possible level of government—national or, better 
yet, international. Positive climate impacts are, however, but one of many impacts 
of technological advances at the edge of the grid. Other environmental benefits, such 
as those related to cleaner air and water conservation, manifest themselves on a more 
localized scale.134 Moving from environmental to economic impacts, benefits related 
to fewer grid congestion issues and costs thanks to greater efforts to preserve grid 
reliability with intermittent resources accrue primarily at a local level.135 Together, 
these and other smaller scale impacts suggest the state, rather than regional or 
federal, forum as the ideal locus for much of the regulation required to unleash free 
trade in electric power. 
Finally, while the change proposed is dramatic, the authors are mindful of the 
constraints on this approach imposed by the long-settled division of jurisdictional 
authority between federal and state regulators, even if the precise contours of that 
boundary are in flux. The purpose of an energy-related trade (whether an acquisition 
is for end-use or resale) or its geographic scope (transmission across state boundaries 
or distribution across the street) will decide whether that transaction is subject to 
federal or state jurisdiction.136  
The difficulties of ascertaining the dividing line between state and federal 
jurisdiction are well known, and have prompted numerous suggestions for reform.137 																																																								
132 Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1673 (cautioning against the 
matching principle’s historical tendency to focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the top-
level, farthest reaching impacts of policy issues, at the expense of other, more localized but 
no less critical impacts and considerations). 
133 Id. at 1674–76. 
134 See, e.g., Jonathan Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions 
from Older Power Plants, 9 RISK IN PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (2001). 
135 Mormann, State Climate Policy Innovation, supra note 15, at 234. 
136 Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1788–89 (discussing the 
history of FPA provisions that draw a line between “wholesale” jurisdiction subject to federal 
regulation, and “retail” jurisdiction subject to regulation by the states). 
137 Many, including us, advocate for addressing the jurisdictional quagmire that has 
hampered innovation in the electricity industry in recent years. See, e.g., Eisen, FERC’s 
Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1781; Rossi, supra note 15, at 400–01; Robert R. 
Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation of Today’s 
Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203, 213–15 (2015) (discussing the current regulatory division 
of the electric power industry and reviewing options for needed changes); Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. 
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Regulatory reform should do much more than replace the traditional model of cost-
of-service ratemaking with a market-based regime. Because the flow of electricity 
transcends state and other jurisdictional boundaries,138 regulatory reform will 
eventually need to address a mismatch in geographic scale.139 That mismatch 
resulted from a mix of federal and state policies that apply distinctions from the past 
to regulate wholesale and retail markets, resource control systems, transmission and 
distribution control systems, and customer energy management systems.140  
Some commentators argue for a stronger federal role in electricity regulation, 
and these arguments are bolstered by recent Supreme Court decisions.141 Others 
would envision a new form of hybrid regulation involving both levels of 
government.142 For now, however, take the division of authority as it stands and aim 
to minimize jurisdictional tension, as abrupt shifts in the distribution of authority 
would delay or block its implementation. As described in greater detail below, the 
more straightforward approach to interpreting “wholesale” and “retail” would 
reduce jurisdictional difficulties, not add to them. 
 
B.  Specific Design Principles 
 
With these overarching goals in mind, this section now turns to more specific 
features of this approach. There are seven core attributes of the new power trading 
paradigm. 
 
1.  Grid-Centered Development 
 
Fundamentally, this approach is grid-centered, building on the existing electric 
grid’s infrastructure, not some other physical network that might someday replace 
it. This approach does not envision “high-end disruption,”143 or full replacement of 
the current grid in the near term by an alternative means of delivering electricity to 
end users. This may disappoint those who propose innovative and creative ways in 
which other firms could deliver electricity, but the more pragmatic approach 
																																																								
REV. BULL. 97, 105–08 (2015) (arguing that regulation of the electric power industry is done 
best through a collaborative effort by private actors, states, and regional entities).  
138 Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1788. 
139 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 5.   
140 Id. 
141 Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1788. 
142 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 
MD. L. REV. 773, 776 (2013). 
143 Juan Pablo Vazquez Sampere, Why Platform Disruption Is So Much Bigger than 
Product Disruption, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 8, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/why-platform-
disruption-is-so-much-bigger-than-product-disruption [https://perma.cc/D56R-LHFH] 
(stating that high end disruption is “entering the market with a product or platform that is 
superior to incumbents’ offerings”).   
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recognizes certain undeniable realities of the electric utility industry,144 where high-
end disruption is hardly imminent, and change has always been, and will likely 
continue to be, more incremental than in other industries.  
For all the clamor that this is an industry on the cusp of disruption, it is not. 
Some foresee a “new energy network,” or an “energy cloud,” or some alchemical 
“orchestrator” spinning a network out of a combination of new technologies.145 But 
for electricity distribution, this is mere talk. The potential disruptor of this industry 
neither exists today nor is it on the horizon. Unlike, say, Uber and Airbnb, which 
deliver service through alternate distribution channels, this industry still largely 
depends on monopoly control of a single physical wire to a customer’s premises. 
High-end disruptions are expensive, and electricity distribution with its natural 
monopoly characteristics would be no different. Electric power distribution systems 
are extremely capital-intensive to build and maintain, so it is unlikely that anyone 
will duplicate the existing ones. And the few entities with other means of physical 
access to residential premises (cable companies, for example) would need to engage 
in considerable—and costly—retooling of their infrastructure to become credible 
competitors.  
In the near to medium term, it is hard to imagine the emergence of any 
technologically and commercially viable alternative to today’s system of electricity 
distribution. Some promising business models, such as microgrids, would lead to 
physical cord cutting. At the current scale and pace of these experiments, however, 
it would be many years before large numbers of consumers could survive on their 
own without their incumbent distribution utilities. Wireless transmission of electric 
energy, which could theoretically bypass incumbent utilities and their monopoly 
over distribution wires, may be ready to charge cell phone batteries over minimal 
distances. But, for now, wireless routing of electricity remains an elusive dream at 
the scale and distance required to power households, let alone commercial and 
industrial enterprises. The promising combination of solar panels and storage is not 
yet ready to replace the distribution system either.146 In sum, it is an enormous and 
unwarranted leap of faith to imagine a technologically and commercially viable 
alternative to today’s electricity distribution system emerging any time soon.   
																																																								
144 For another example of pragmatism in approaching complex issues in the electric 
utility industry (in this case, the “stranded costs” that result during and after major regulatory 
shifts), see Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 
BROOK. L. REV. 645, 645–47 (2017).  
145 See, e.g., Navigating the Energy Transformation, supra note 52, at 13–14 
(discussing a potential electricity “orchestrator”).   
146 Widespread availability of these systems is still in the future without a standardized 
means of financing and installation. See Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax 
Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 360–61 
(2014) [hereinafter Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits] (arguing that the current reliance on 
nonrefundable tax credits to finance solar, wind, and other renewables impedes more 
widespread participation in the deployment of renewable energy technologies); Eisen, 
Residential Renewable Energy, supra note 13, at 339.  
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Fortunately, a new trading paradigm can be achieved within the limits of 
today’s electricity infrastructure, adding, for example, a platform trading 
architecture for C2C transactions. Surely in some instances, new components will 
need to be added to the existing physical network to improve its capabilities or 
access to it.147 In many situations, would-be-participants not currently on the 
distribution system will need new or upgraded physical connections. The continuing 
proliferation of distributed solar and other DERs at the edge of the grid illustrates 
that, with proper economic incentives and regulatory frameworks in place, the 
existing grid is perfectly capable of delivering these and other connectivity upgrades. 
 
2.  Open Access to and for All Participants 
 
The new power trading paradigm is premised upon granting open, 
nondiscriminatory access to the electric grid and the economic opportunities it 
provides.148 At present, numerous barriers to entry prevent more widespread 
participation of individuals and nonutility entities in the energy economy. For 
example, monopoly-protected distribution utilities may prevent potential 
competitors from using their wires. Changing this would require permission to use 
their systems, and, in many cases, development of new technologies or processes for 
enabling access, or refinement of those already existing.149 Open access requires 
more than a commitment to enabling access: it requires defining the terms and 
conditions of open market interactions among participants.150 This may necessitate 
a positive definition of “open access,” or, as proposed, model conditions for open 
access paired with a market structure that facilitates it. 																																																								
147 See, e.g., Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E), A 16-09-001(Sept. 1, 2016) 
(utility Southern California Edison’s application in its 2018 general rate case, to justify rate 
recovery of $2.2 billion in distribution grid modernization and technology costs in 
conjunction with a potential transformation into a distribution system operator). See also The 
Emerging Clean Energy Economy, SO. CALI. EDISON (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.edison.com/content/dam/eix/documents/our-perspective/der-dso-white-paper-
final-201609.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GWY-X6DL]; Response of the Solar Energy Industries 
Ass’n, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, A 16-09-001 (Oct. 3, 2016), at 4 (questioning, inter alia, 
“whether these costs would have been incurred in the absence of DERs”). 
148 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 53 (calling for a “level playing field” for 
DERs, “regardless of the structure of ownership and control” and specifying that this 
“requires a neutral market platform to facilitate all commercial transactions”).  
149 CAL. INDEP. SYS. OP. CORP., DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE PROVIDER 
INITIATIVE, ER16-1085-000, Mar. 4, 2016 [hereinafter CAISO DER AGGREGATION TARIFF 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL] at 3. One example of the technologies and processes that would 
need to change for nondiscriminatory access to the grid is some means of making relevant 
data more widely available. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 199 (discussing the 
idea of a “data hub”); see infra Part IV (discussing privacy concerns with more accessible 
customer data).   
150 Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation 
on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712, 1724–26 (2014) (discussing an “open access 
distribution tariff” to define these terms and conditions). 
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Grid access for nonutility actors should be nondiscriminatory access that 
requires utilities to carry the resources of other firms without preference to their own 
resources. To maintain the grid’s physical and financial health, the utilities’ 
obligation to grant open and nondiscriminatory access should be accompanied by a 
compensation scheme, such as a transaction fee, a fixed charge for use of distribution 
wires, or a combination of both.151 
 
3.  State-Level Platform Markets: The “Airbnb” of Electricity 
 
This Article proposes a framework for trading that empowers transactions 
among individuals, businesses, and aggregators that bundle distributed resources. 
As noted above, the authors envision a multidimensional system of platform markets 
in individual states that supports the broadest possible group of purchasers and 
sellers, including C2C transactions.152 
An exhaustive treatment of the burgeoning literature on the economics of 
trading platforms is beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly, the following 
discussion focuses on a few key characteristics of platform economics and how they 
can help foster free trade for electricity. Exchanges have a “triangulated” structure 
in which one or more intermediaries must facilitate users’ transactions,153 serving as 
their primary point of contact with the platform. The literature separates platforms 
into those with open and closed ownership structures; in the former, the platform 
sponsor and participants establish structures and rules, and any restrictions on 
participation are uniformly applied;154 in the latter, a single provider operates the 
platform and establishes its rules.155 This Article proposes an open structure in which 
the states implement platform markets, and in which PUCs develop market 
structures, rules, and regulations to protect consumers and the public interest. 
A platform is independent of its participants, so it promotes no specific industry 
structure156 or any specific geographic scope unless market rules define it. In this 
proposal, exchanges would be designed, approved, and supervised by state PUCs. 
The choice of the state forum imposes geographic limitations on a grid whose 
physical boundaries transcend state lines. Yet, this choice respects the states’ 																																																								
151 See infra notes 160–163 and accompanying text.  
152 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.   
153 Eisenmann et al., supra note 114, at 134 (observing that “[u]sers transact with each 
other and simultaneously affiliate with platform providers” and that the “platform 
encompasses the set of components and rules employed in common in most user 
transactions”).   
154 Id. at 131. 
155 Tom Eisenmann, Business Model Analysis, Part 2: Platforms and Network Effects, 
PLATFORMS AND NETWORKS (July 23, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://platformsandnetworks.blog 
spot.com/2011/07/business-model-analysis-part-2.html [https://perma.cc/9PWP-KHSE] 
(noting that, “the concept of an ‘open platform’ can lead to confusion, because platform 
mediated networks encompass several ecosystem layers—each of which can be open or 
closed”).  
156 Kiesling, supra note 116. 
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authority over retail sales and acknowledges that the advent of markets promises to 
change the industry’s organizational structure substantially. There are other 
possibilities, of course, such as one nationwide, federally regulated market for 
electricity. After all, there is no “California Airbnb.” But a national platform would 
blur, if not altogether erase long standing jurisdictional boundaries and prompt 
opposition that would stop evolution toward the future in its tracks. Once again, the 
reluctance to upset the jurisdictional apple cart prompts the assignment of primary 
responsibility for establishing markets to individual states, although states could 
choose to enter into multistate markets. 
Among these platforms’ most basic functions would be the purchase and sale 
of electricity. Exchanges should, however, also trade other resources, including 
services and other products likely to contribute to system reliability and security. 
Demand-and supply-side resources would converge: markets could simultaneously 
trade both electricity and demand response, for example. A robust platform could 
contribute to system flexibility by diversifying the portfolio of resources used to 
meet demand and stabilize the distribution system.157 A platform that enables trading 
of a variety of resources is also consistent with the goal of encouraging the broadest 
possible experimentation in the distribution system. And for a state market to 
support the broadest possible set of transactions, it cannot bar participation by any 
class of potential customers, including incumbent utilities. In a market environment, 
utilities could focus more on offering products and services than owning 
infrastructure assets. They could become service providers, and enter into new 
markets themselves. For example, they could analyze smart meter data to identify 
and monetize specific market opportunities. They could enter into partnerships with 
innovators to deliver products and services such as sophisticated energy 
management packages. Finally, they could develop their own DERs (as is already 
the case in some areas)158 in competition with other owners.  
Eventually, markets should allow individuals to participate directly or through 
entities that handle the mechanics of bidding.159 Legal impediments to broad-based 
participation would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting anywhere/anytime 
transactions. From an economic perspective, fees such as the “demand charges” on 
																																																								
157 Kristov & DeMartini, supra note 73, at 5 (observing that DERs can provide 
“distributed reliability services” to help stabilize the grid). 
158 Diane Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, A Big Test for Big Batteries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/14/business/energy-environment/california-
big-batteries-as-power-plants.html [https://perma.cc/X5DE-G4AH] (discussing California 
utilities’ battery storage installations). 
159 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 25 (“Potential users of such 
a platform include not just retail commodity suppliers, but also demand response 
aggregators, third-party merchant DG and storage providers, and customers with excess 
distributed energy.”) (emphasis added). The authors recognize the potential reliability 
concerns (see infra Part IV), but believe market structures can and should be flexible enough 
so that once markets demonstrate expertise with balancing supply and demand, they can scale 
up to allow individuals to participate directly.  
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DER owners currently contemplated by a number of states,160 would raise similar 
barriers to market entry. Accordingly, the authors propose to compensate utilities by 
other means. Whether a platform should feature asymmetries in pricing and features 
is an important recurring issue identified in the literature.161 Imposing a fee for 
participation only on one side of a transaction, for example, can hamper the 
participation of that side, even if it promotes the participation of the other. Other 
pricing issues, such as compensation for the platform administrator, will also need 
to be addressed. 
The tenet that any seller should be able to sell to any buyer, without restriction, 
represents a fundamental departure from the current unidirectional system, in which 
consumers are limited to the role of buyers and price takers. To this end, state 
markets should adopt standardized means of interaction, rules for executing trades 
among participants, as well as measurement and verification protocols. The 
transition to the new power trading paradigm will be complicated by reliability 
issues, as the proper balance between proven and experimental resources is critical 
to meeting demand. It is anticipated that numerous aspects of the platform design 
will address this problem, including settlement and imbalance mechanisms, and 
informational tools such as ratings systems designed to help establish buyers’ trust 
in new suppliers.162   
In keeping with an evolutionary, institutionally agnostic approach, the proposed 
state markets are compatible with existing climate and clean energy policies, such 
as the renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”) adopted by twenty-nine states, the 
District of Columbia, and three U.S. territories.163 RPS policies create markets for 
solar, wind, and other renewable energy resources by requiring load-serving utilities 
to source a certain percentage of the electricity they sell from renewables.164 Utilities 
prove their compliance with “renewable energy credits” (“RECs”) that serve as a 
guarantee of origin for renewably generated electricity. Eligible generators can sell 
these RECs in addition to their power output to earn a premium for their commitment 
to renewables. RECs need not be traded jointly with the electricity for which they 																																																								
160 Revesz & Unel, supra note 30, at 66. For a discussion of the demand charge 
controversy, see Seth Blumsack, Utilities, Solar Energy and the Fight For Your Roof, THE 
CONVERSATION (Feb. 10, 2016, 6:06 AM), https://theconversation.com/utilities-solar-
energy-and-the-fight-for-your-roof-54019 [https://perma.cc/K2YT-SGYX]. 
161 See EVANS, supra note 112, at 13. For a specific asymmetric pricing proposal in 
distribution-level markets, see TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at ES-6 (suggesting a 5% fee 
in a New York REV market for the DER owner only, as “DER do not have a strong 
alternative location to sell their products while the buyers of their products (ESCOs and 
Distribution Utilities) can acquire alternatives in the wholesale market.”).   
162 The dot com B2B exchanges failed in part because corporate procurement officers 
were unwilling to purchase from unproven suppliers. See EVANS, supra note 112, at 64–65. 
Buyers’ trust in sellers would be even more difficult to develop for electricity, a commodity 
that most people find indispensable.  
163 For a state by state listing of RPSs, see Database of State Incentives for Renewables 
& Efficiency, supra note 109. 
164 See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1631. 
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were originally awarded. As a result of this unbundling, renewable electricity can 
trade on existing wholesale and newly created state markets alongside conventional 
electricity. Of equal importance, considering the recent finalization of the Obama 
administration’s Clean Power Plan165 and similar initiatives, is the compatibility of 
the trading paradigm with the introduction of a price on carbon in the—however 
distant—future. Whatever the fate of the Clean Power Plan in the courts166 under the 
Trump administration,167 it has already added further momentum to the climate 
policy activism at the state and regional levels; including initiatives for carbon 
pricing.168 
 
4.  Interplay of Two Size-Sensitive Market Formats 
 
In the new power trading paradigm, larger electricity resources, such as thermal 
power plants, will likely continue to be traded in wholesale markets, while 
distributed solar and other smaller-scale resources would trade in state markets, 
including most C2C and C2B transactions. Wholesale and state markets would likely 
compete for the trading of midsized resources, such as cogeneration facilities, 
commercial wind farms, and utility-scale solar, offering powerful incentives for 
continuing efforts to improve their respective platform structure, protocols, and 
other offerings. 																																																								
165 For a subset of many discussions of the Clean Power Plan, see generally Emily 
Hammond & Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of 
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL L. 1 (2016); 
Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon 
Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143 (2016); Tomás Carbonell, EPA’s Proposed Clean Power 
Plan: Protecting Climate and Public Health by Reducing Carbon Pollution from the U.S. 
Power Sector, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 403 (2015). 
166 Within twelve hours of the final rule’s publication in the federal register, the Clean 
Power Plan became the most heavily litigated environmental regulation ever. See Emily 
Holden & Rod Kuckro, The fate of the Obama administration’s signature climate change 
rule is in the hands of the courts, E&E NEWS, https://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_ 
power_plan/fact_sheets/legal [https://perma.cc/843Z-RRJ6] (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). See 
West Virginia v. E.P.A., 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016) (staying the Clean Power Plan’s 
implementation until resolution of pending challenges). 
167 President Donald Trump has “vowed to kill the Clean Power Plan,” but the large 
number of intervenors on behalf of the EPA in its defense suggests that the agency’s 
withdrawal from the suit would not be sufficient for the Clean Power Plan’s opponents to 
win. See Chelsea Harvey, Trump Has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan. Here’s How He 
Might—and Might Not—Succeed, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/11/trump-has-vowed-to-kill-the-clean-
power-plan-heres-how-he-might-and-might-not-succeed/?utm_term=.dfe7c9ed7729 
[https://perma.cc/K9PJ-CG9Y].   
168 See Michael Wara, A Bad Day for U.S. Energy and Climate Policy, STAN. L. SCH.: 
LEGAL AGGREGATE (Feb. 10, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/02/10/a-bad-day-for-u-s-
energy-and-climate-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8352-4EGH] (noting that the U.S. electricity 
industry has already begun work on complying with the Clean Power Plan’s requirements). 
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This size-sensitive differentiation between two different types of markets is not 
self-evident. Notwithstanding the considerable potential for market innovation, state 
markets will inevitably duplicate some wholesale market functions. Allowing direct 
participation in wholesale markets for resources and transactions of all sizes might, 
therefore, at a glance be considered a more efficient approach. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court recently provided some support for this approach with its “definitive 
pronouncement”169 in FERC v. EPSA170 that FERC may promote injection of 
demand response into the wholesale markets.171 This allows some end users to 
consume electricity and provide resources (that is, demand response) to the grid 
simultaneously. Thus, FERC v. EPSA might be read to empower full participation 
of individual DERs in wholesale markets,172 although the opinion did not go that 
far.173 
This Article deliberately advocates against such a one-size-fits-all approach 
that would make today’s wholesale markets the exclusive venue of tomorrow’s free 
trade environment. Accommodation of a diverse set of smaller-scale resources and 
transactions would likely impair the wholesale markets’ continued growth, their 
considerable advances in balancing supply and demand across entire regions, and 
the regional governance mechanisms that have fostered their development. This 
framework respects these institutional arrangements by preserving these markets 
and their current requirements for participation, such as minimum size restrictions 
(which would prove difficult, if not impossible, for most DERs to meet).174 Inflows 
of new small-scale resources would challenge the stability of markets that are not 
currently set up to manage them.175 Nothing, however, should prevent savvy 
entrepreneurs from aggregating blocks of DERs to reach the critical mass required 
for participation in existing wholesale markets enhancing the latter’s flexibility and 
resilience.176 
Under this proposal, therefore, larger transactions (including block sales of 
electricity by aggregators) would primarily take place in existing wholesale markets, 
as would B2B and B2C transactions of electricity at utility scale. State markets 
would handle smaller transactions and direct sales to end users by individuals.177 																																																								
169 Eisen, FERC v. EPSA, supra note 41, at 7. 
170 F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016). 
171 Id. at 784. 
172 Anne Hoskins & Paul Roberti, The Essential Role of State Engagement in Demand 
Response, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 14, 14–15 (2016).  
173 Eisen, FERC v. EPSA, supra note 41, at 7–8 (noting the limitations on FERC’s 
jurisdiction under the “directly affecting” test enunciated in the Supreme Court’s decision). 
174 See discussion infra Part III. 
175 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 54–56. 
176 See Amy L. Stein, Regulating Reliability, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1191, 1226 n.216 (2017) 
(explaining how California allows entrepreneurs to aggregate DERs). 
177 Designers of state markets could mesh their size limits with those of the wholesale 
markets, or impose different maximum resource sizes. Coordination on this issue between 
market administrators and ISOs and RTOs is one of many issues of overlap between the 
different markets. Infra Part III. 
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With their smaller volume requirements and lower barriers to entry, state markets 
also recommend themselves as test beds for experimentation with sales of products 
and services not currently offered on the competitive wholesale markets. 
 
5.  Redefining the Role of Distribution Utilities 
 
This approach redefines the role of distribution utilities, asking them to take on 
responsibilities well beyond their traditional functions of serving load through 
existing infrastructure. It is expected that distribution utilities will be responsible for 
managing a dynamically changing portfolio of resources, including both traditional 
generation and DERs. As more states experiment with distribution system reforms, 
incumbent utilities will likely become the market operators.178 In this framework, 
the utility dispatches electricity resources to its distribution-level customers, much 
like an RTO does at the regional level. Utilities would administer markets and 
continue to have responsibility for operating the distribution system, matching 
supply and demand instantaneously, and maintaining this balance under a variety of 
contingencies, including input of new resources. As more resources connect directly 
to the market, this would require physical and intelligence capabilities to 
dynamically manage resources and simultaneously balance supply and demand in 
real time. 
Former FERC chairman Jon Wellinghoff and others have proposed that 
“independent distribution system operators” (“IDSO”) control the distribution 
grid.179 Following the example of ISOs and RTOs at the wholesale level, an IDSO 
would independently administer the markets, and would have operational control 
over the distribution system. In keeping with the ISO/RTO trend at the transmission 
level, unbundling would sever the link between ownership, or at the very least 
management, of the distribution system.180 While distribution utilities might 
continue to own system assets, they would turn over their control to the IDSO. 
Operational control would leave the IDSO responsible for managing local loads 
while interacting with the state and wholesale markets as necessary. The IDSO 
model would transform today’s distribution utilities into carriers responsible for 
delivering electricity and serving customers. 																																																								
178 The alternative of an independent system operator, discussed below, is not viable at 
present. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 200 (discussing how utilities as DSOs is 
the only option that has “proven its practical viability at the distribution level.”). This raises 
considerable issues of how the utility should be compensated for developing this 
infrastructure. See infra Part III. 
179 See, e.g., James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Rooftop Parity, FORTNIGHTLY MAG. 
(Aug. 2014), https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rooftop-parity 
[https://perma.cc/HY4E-LE3K]; Jeremy Lin and Katarina Knezovic, Comparative Analysis 
of Possible Designs for Flexible Distribution System Operation, 2016 13th Int’l Conf. on the 
European Energy Mkt. (EEM) (Jun. 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Katarina_ 
Knezovic/publications; Eisen, supra note 5, at 13 n.175 (discussing the IDSO’s proponents).  
180 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 198 Table 6.2 (listing this as an attribute 
of a DSO). 
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In keeping with its evolutionary approach, this framework neither forecloses 
nor requires the IDSO model. The authors are, however, skeptical of its successful 
adoption in the near term. Any IDSO would have to be invented anew. Unlike the 
ISOs and RTOs that had antecedents in the power pools that predated today’s 
regional grids, there are no obvious precursors to IDSOs with the requisite expertise. 
Thus, states are likely to turn to incumbent utilities, rather than untested newcomers, 
as retail market administrators. As the new power trading paradigm invites more 
widespread participation by nonutility actors, the latter will gain critical market 
expertise that could, one day, enable them to assume some, or all, of the IDSO’s 
responsibilities. 
Tasking incumbent utilities with administration of novel markets is, of course, 
reminiscent of the classic “fox in charge of the henhouse” situation. After all, the 
more successful wholesale and state markets are, the greater the competition will be 
for a utility’s power generation assets. Some fear that this conflict of interest would 
slow the path to market competition.181 Yet, this approach is both appropriate and 
pragmatic. Ousting incumbent utilities immediately from control of the distribution 
grid would ignore their substantial technological expertise and exacerbate likely 
opposition to the new power trading paradigm, as discussed further below.182 These 
political and technological realities suggest an evolutionary experiment with this 
approach rather than leaping into an untested future. In the meantime, a robust 
system of consumer protection built into the markets can help alleviate concerns 
about giving distribution utilities a central role.  
Finally, the continued market participation of utilities raises concerns over a 
potential conflict of interest if the same utilities also serve as market administrators. 
Careful PUC oversight of the development and implementation of market rules 
could, however, help to avoid discriminatory practices and other undue preferences, 
following the example set by successful FERC oversight and regulation of wholesale 
electricity markets. 
 
6.  Compensation for Market Administration and Use of Utility Assets 
 
In the new trading paradigm, utilities tasked with administering state markets 
need to be compensated for their efforts. The specifics of their compensation lie 
beyond the scope of this Article183—all the more so considering the wealth of 
competing models for marketplaces and platforms, such as stock exchanges,184 																																																								
181 Navigating the Energy Transformation, supra note 52, at 20 (stating that with 
utilities as DSPs in New York, “the evolution to full market liberalization will be likely 
slower than initially conceived”). 
182 See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
183 There is no standard means of compensation on platforms. Some charge a fee per 
transaction to one side, while some platforms charge to both. Moreover, it is difficult in 
advance to ascertain the costs of providing the platform due to potential scale economies and 
other considerations. See EVANS, supra note 112, at 79. 
184 Trading Fees, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/trading-
info/fees [https://perma.cc/Z6D5-3FSK] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
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eBay,185 Uber,186 and Airbnb187—each with its own compensation scheme. This 
section, however, highlights a few high-level characteristics of a compensation 
scheme that can facilitate widespread trading in energy products and services. To 
invite market participation by large and small actors alike, disproportionately high 
registration fees or flat fees that disproportionately privilege higher-volume traders 
should be avoided. Volumetric charges based on a multi-tiered, gradually declining 
fee schedule offer one way of making small-volume trades economically viable 
while honoring the economies of scale associated with higher volume repeat trades.  
Utilities will require compensation not only for their oversight and operation of 
newly created power markets but, critically, for use of the physical infrastructure 
required to transfer electricity between parties.188 FERC has long administered a 
system of charges for a utility’s “wheeling”189 of power from third-party generators 
through its wires.190 The new trading paradigm would require a similar system of 
wire charges at the distribution level. These charges would enable utilities with ever 
shrinking shares in the electricity generation mix to continue to earn revenues from 
their wires while avoiding free riding by third-party generators and their customers. 
Along the way, wire charges offer a metric, and possibly, a remedy for grid 
congestion. While none of these objectives are mutually exclusive, their joint 
realization will require a carefully designed and administered system of wire 
charges.  
Lessons learned from retail restructuring suggest that wire charges set above a 
certain level may prevent third-party generators from competing with the generation 
assets of incumbent utilities that can deliver electricity while, ultimately, 
internalizing applicable wire charges. The combination of wire charges and other 
factors inhibiting entry made it impossible in some states for nonutility actors to 
compete with incumbent suppliers and for full retail choice to be achieved.191   																																																								
185 Standard Selling Fees, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html#if_auction 
[https://perma.cc/M9Z2-XSYK] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
186 Christian Perea, What’s The Real Commission That Uber Takes From Its Drivers? 
[Infographic], THE RIDESHARE GUY (July 15, 2016), http://therideshareguy.com/whats-the-
real-commission-that-uber-takes-from-its-drivers-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/33DL-
ZCFG]. 
187 What are Airbnb Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/63 
/what-are-host-service-fees (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9TGM-6CMP]. 
188 Rapid industry change has led to compensation for “stranded costs” (utilities’ costs 
not yet recouped). See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 144, at 646–47. The authors also 
acknowledge the challenge of compensating existing generators, and believe it may be 
addressed with the ability to bid into markets. 
189 Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1818 (defining wheeling as 
transmitting power for third parties over transmission lines and discussing FERC’s wheeling 
policies of the 1990s). 
190 See supra text accompanying note 103 (discussing FERC’s orders on this subject). 
191 See, e.g., VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON ELECTRIC 
UTILITY RESTRUCTURING OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY ii–iv (2005), 
https://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/reports/2005_intro.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z6F-VTNE] 
(detailing the lack of choice in Virginia, leading to suspension of the state’s retail choice 
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Nodal pricing would enable a dynamic schedule of wire charges that reflects 
congestion levels with high spatial and temporal resolution. Through iterative 
learning processes, congestion-sensitive wire charges would eventually inform 
clearing prices for the sale of delivered electricity in the newly created power 
markets. In the process, market participants will learn to place a premium on DERs 
and other local generation assets whose output requires sparse use of distribution 
cables and, therefore, incur smaller wire charges. 
 
7.  Hands-Off Regulation for Off-Grid Transactions 
 
A final attribute involves the treatment of off-system transactions. The authors 
anticipate few restrictions on direct peer-to-peer transactions that do not involve the 
use of the distribution system. Think of the above example of a California commune 
selling the output from its solar installation in the form of pre-charged batteries at 
her local farmers’ market.192 Such a small-scale, off-grid transaction would not merit 
the same regulatory treatment as delivery over the grid’s distribution system.  
As batteries and other storage technologies continue to move along the 
technology learning curve,193 off-grid transactions may grow in scale. Eventually, 
that might begin to impact overall system reliability by changing demand 
substantially for on-grid transactions. At this point, some tracking of off-grid 
transactions may become necessary, as their availability could affect overall system 
demand and, hence, system reliability. In the near to medium term, the need for 
greater oversight should, however, be outweighed by the dampening impact of 
anything more than light-handed regulation. 
 
III.  TOWARD A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FREE TRADE IN ELECTRICITY 
 
The electricity trading framework rests on two core policy building blocks. The 
first is CAISO’s initiative to allow aggregators to sell DERs into wholesale markets. 
The second is New York’s commitment to refashioning distribution utilities as 
“distribution system platform providers” (DSPPs) responsible for administering the 
distribution-level system and operating markets for distribution-level products and 
services. This section describes the central features of both programs and gives a 
sense of how they would lead toward full electricity trading, if revised and extended 
to a wider geographic scope.  
Currently at the pilot stage, California’s aggregation initiative offers an 
intriguing way of broadening the pool of participants in existing wholesale markets, 
albeit through intermediaries. A recent FERC rulemaking proposal suggests that 
CAISO’s program could be extended to other ISOs and RTOs across the nation. 
Conversely, the New York program sets the stage for critical innovation and market 																																																								
program). See also William T. Reisinger, Public Utilities Law, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 137, 
139–53 (2014) (discussing the state’s experience with retail choice). 
192 See supra Section I.B.3. 
193 See Stein, supra note 43, at 707–08 (discussion the expansion of battery storage). 
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building at the state level that will enable smaller-scale suppliers to engage directly 
in transactions with individuals. Properly combined, expanded, and refined, both 
programs could go a long way toward unlocking free trade in electricity. 
 
A.  Building Blocks: Initiatives in New York and California 	
1.  Aggregating DERs for Wholesale Market Integration (California) 
 
The California regional grid operator (“CAISO”) has developed an initiative to 
promote DER integration in the regional grid by eliminating structural market 
barriers to DER participation.194 For example, a rooftop solar owner cannot currently 
bid any excess electricity into the wholesale market, due to minimum requirements 
of both size and telemetry.195 Aggregation of smaller outputs of electricity from 
multiple generators would give DERs access to California’s wholesale markets for 
which they do not qualify as individual resources. Market access would open up new 
sales channels for distributed solar and other smaller-scale generators that are 
currently at the mercy of a monopsony buyer—their local utility.196 Aggregated 
market access offers sizeable benefits to DERs and to the grid itself. California’s 
reliance on net metering has made it difficult to keep track of the exact capacity and 
output of customer-sited DERs.197 Aggregation would help increase the visibility of 
these resources enabling the grid operator—CAISO—to better anticipate their 
contributions, integrate more renewables into the grid, and rely on a wider range of 
resources when balancing supply with demand.198  
To achieve these goals, CAISO developed the “Distributed Energy Resource 
Provider” initiative199 to enable direct bids of DERs into California’s wholesale 
markets through a new form of supplier—the “distributed energy resource provider” 
(“DERP”).200 This “new type of market resource similar to a generating facility” will 
aggregate the output of multiple smaller-scale residential and commercial DERs, 
and sell the resulting blocks into wholesale markets in sizes sufficient to meet market 
minimums.201 The proposal’s major innovation is to “treat the aggregation, rather 
than the individual distributed energy resources, as the market resource.”202 DERs 
aggregated in this fashion could take a wide variety of forms. The proposal defines 																																																								
194 CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP., FAST FACTS 1 (2016), http://www.caiso.com/ 
documents/flexibleresourceshelprenewables_fastfacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4BN-6JB]. 
195 Id. at 1–2. 
196 Id. at 2. 
197 See Mormann et al., supra note 25, at 69 (explaining that data “is not readily 
available for . . . solar facilities that are customer-owned and located ‘behind the meter.’”). 
198 CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP., supra note 194, at 3.  
199 See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS 
SUBJECT TO CONDITION, ER16-1085-000 (June 2, 2016) (describing and approving the 
initiative). 
200 CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP., supra note 194, at 3. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 8–9. 
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DERs broadly to include any resources with first points of interconnection to utility 
distribution companies or metered subsystems, including rooftop solar systems, 
storage systems, grid-connected microgrids, and even plug-in electric vehicles.203 
These resources could be located in front of or behind a customer’s meter. 
To illustrate, if an electric vehicle charging station wants to store electricity 
from incoming batteries and use it as a market resource, it, not individual drivers, 
would handle the mechanics of metering and other logistics, and bid the resource 
into CAISO’s wholesale markets. The proposal imposes minimum and maximum 
size restrictions on both aggregated blocks and their individual “member” 
resources.204 If a bundle of DERs includes resources located at different pricing 
nodes on the CAISO grid, the bundle’s aggregate size may not exceed 20 MW. 
Notwithstanding objections by some commenters who believe this practice would 
limit the geographic reach of aggregators,205 CAISO’s proposal limits each 
aggregator to a single aggregation point to ensure that it does not create additional 
congestion on the CAISO-controlled grid.206  
Like any other market participant, DERPs must ensure that the resources they 
bid into wholesale markets are furnished at the right time and in the right quantities. 
This requires sophisticated remote-control mechanisms, metering and 
communication with individual DER owners, and familiarity with the CAISO 
markets’ scheduling and bidding requirements.207 In practice, a DERP could either 
employ a “scheduling coordinator” or act as its own coordinator.208 The coordinator 
would serve as an intermediary for CAISO dispatch instructions, coordinating with 
individual resources in the aggregation. This mediated coordination regime relieves 
CAISO of the burden of communicating and managing vast numbers of individual 
resources.209  
																																																								
203 Id. at 5. 
204 Under the proposal, the minimum size for an aggregated resource is 0.5 MW, and 
the maximum size for an aggregation spanning pricing nodes is 20 MW. Generating units 
between 0.5 MW and 1 MW can become part of an aggregation under specified conditions, 
but units 1 MW or greater are ineligible for aggregation, and must satisfy CAISO’s 
requirements for market participation instead. ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF 
REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION, supra note 199, at 2–3. 
205 Herman K. Trabish, How California plans to integrate distributed resources into its 
ISO market, UTILITY DIVE (June 24, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-
california-plans-to-integrate-distributed-resources-into-its-iso-market/401123/ 
[https://perma.cc/8XD5-EHGE]. 
206 CAISO DER AGGREGATION TARIFF AMENDMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at 10–
11.   
207 See, e.g., ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION, 
supra note 199, at 4–6 (telemetry). 
208 Id. at 2. 
209 See id. at 5; see also Trabish, supra note 205 (quoting CAISO Senior Public 
Information Office Steven Greenlee, “We can’t put an ISO meter on every rooftop solar 
installation . . . . The cost would be prohibitive.”). 
2018] FREE TRADE IN ELECTRIC POWER 95 
	
As this proposal involved wholesale markets under FERC jurisdiction,210 the 
CAISO needed, and secured, FERC’s approval.211 The broad definition of DERs 
could dramatically expand the types and amounts of distributed resources in 
CAISO’s wholesale markets, create new classes of grid participants, and stimulate 
market competition. A wide variety of firms—electric vehicle charging stations, DR 
companies, home automation firms, and partnerships between battery storage and 
solar leasing companies—have already expressed interest in using California’s 
aggregation initiative to enter wholesale markets that are currently beyond their 
reach.212 
 
2.  Transforming Utilities (New York) 
 
New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”) framework, launched by 
the State’s PSC in 2014,213 seeks comprehensive reform of the regulatory structure 
and treatment of the state’s utilities. The initiative’s centerpiece targets the 
transformation of load-serving utilities into “Distribution System Platform 
Providers” (“DSPPs”) to facilitate greater integration of DERs and to provide 
customers with enhanced energy management options. Under this model, the role of 
utilities would change from sellers of electricity to system operators and platform 
providers.  
The PSC split regulatory development in the REV proceeding into two separate 
tracks. Track One focuses on DERs, integrated system planning, distribution-level 
markets, and the Distribution System Platform Provider (“DSPP”) concept.214 The 
Track One orders refashion distribution utilities as platform providers215 (rejecting a 
proposal that these functions be handled by independent entities) and task them with 
administering the distribution system and, eventually, operating markets for 
distribution-level products and services. The Distribution System Platform Provider 
will act as a system optimizer, relying on a diverse portfolio of resources, including 																																																								
210 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2015). 
211 ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION, supra 
note 199, at 1. 
212 Trabish, supra note 205. 
213 The REV encompasses a number of different reforms, including the proceedings to 
refashion the state’s electric utilities. See Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE 
https://rev.ny.gov/ [https://perma.cc/J6UZ-LEH6] (last visited July 31, 2017). 
214 The PSC’s order of February 2015 and subsequent orders in 2016 elaborated on the 
DSPP concept. New York PSC Track One Framework Order, supra note 60, at 12. The 
cornerstones of Track One are the state’s major utilities’ Distributed System Implementation 
Plans and the joint filing in November 2016 of a Supplemental Distributed System 
Implementation Plan to establish a coordinated five year vision for utility distribution system 
planning, grid operations, and market operations. JOINT UTILS. OF N.Y., SUPPLEMENTAL 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: CASE 16-M-0411 (2016), 
http://jointutilitiesofny.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/3A80BFC9-CBD4-4DFD-AE62-
831271013816.pdf [https://perma.cc/58LH-QTSH]. 
215 New York PSC Track One Framework Order, supra note 60, at 12.   
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DERs, to serve customers. Resources could be provided by the utilities themselves, 
as now, or by customers or third-party aggregators. Load-serving utilities would also 
retain ownership of their distribution assets, with the obligations they currently have 
to maintain and upgrade the systems under state laws. 
Track Two focuses on reforming utility ratemaking practices to reflect the 
DSPP model.216 It aims to modernize the utility business model and align utility 
financial interests with evolving consumer interests—adding market-based platform 
earnings and outcome-based earning opportunities for utilities.217 In this system, 
DSPPs are expected to derive a growing share of net income from the growth and/or 
operation of market solutions beyond the traditional cost-of-service model.218 
In the near term, regulators and a wide variety of stakeholders are working on 
topics such as requirements for DER interconnection and hosting capacity. Fully 
robust markets for DERs are still years away, and not anticipated until a later stage 
of the REV proceeding. In the design advanced in a white paper, DSPPs would co-
own the newly established platform: a “business ecosystem” intended to incorporate 
a forward market and a separate clearing market.219 Its designer believes a “Platform 
Market . . . will best fulfill the objectives of the Commission as articulated in its 
Framework Order.”220 The Platform Market would resemble platform structures 
used by companies such as Uber and Airbnb that match buyers and sellers in 
exchange for a percentage fee. Thus, it defines a “core interaction” that, like Uber’s 
pairings of drivers with prospective passengers, matches market participants with 
one another.221 The following illustration from the white paper is a snapshot of the 
kinds of transactions that could be enabled on the New York platform.222  
 
																																																								
216 Id. at 19; see also Proc. on Mot. of the Commn. in Regard to Reforming the Energy 
Vision, Developing the REV Market in New York: DPS Staff Report and Proposal, 14-M-
0101, at 6 (N.Y.P.S.C. Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter New York DPS REV Staff Straw 
Proposal].  
217 New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117, at 25–26. 
218 Id. at 47–48 (describing Platform Service Revenues).   
219 TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at 34. 
220 Id. at 57. 
221 Id. at 40 (“Parties can schedule delivery once parties complete the exchange of 
information and reach an agreement. The core interaction is completed, the parties have 
created and exchanged value, and there is a settlement.”). 
222 Id. at 59. The illustration refers to an “ESCO,” or “energy services company,” the 
familiar umbrella term for a third-party company other than a utility that provides energy 
services. New York law defines an “Energy services company” as “an entity eligible to sell 
energy services to end-use customers using the transmission or distribution system of a 
utility.” N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349-d(b) (McKinney 2017). 




Besides balancing supply and demand variations at the distribution level, the 
DSPP would link with the New York ISO, which manages the state’s high-voltage 
grid and administers wholesale markets. A DSPP could participate in New York’s 
wholesale market as both buyer and seller. As a buyer, it would purchase electricity 
from the wholesale markets, as is common among utilities today, to supplement for 
any shortfall in generation from locally sited assets. As a seller, the platform provider 
could bid local electricity resources, including DERs into the wholesale markets, 
competing in energy, capacity, and even ancillary services markets with merchant 
generators and other suppliers. 
 
B.  A Strategy to Unlock Free Trade for Electric Power 
 
The path toward full electricity trading warrants a combination and extension 
of the California and New York programs to the rest of the nation. At the outset, this 
effort requires visualizing two separate initiatives, conducted at opposite ends of the 
United States, impacting different levels of the electric grid, implemented for 
different purposes, and approved by different levels of regulatory authority, as part 
and parcel of a unified whole. With its reliance on programs already under way, this 
approach does not call for an “energy miracle.”223 Nor does it require active policy 
development by the federal government, which is unlikely in any event in the current 
policy environment. The new power trading paradigm can be achieved here and now 
without the need to invent a new energy ecosystem from whole cloth. 																																																								
223 See, e.g., David Roberts, The Importance of Being Ernest Moniz, VOX (Sept. 22, 
2016), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2016/9/22/13010094/ernest-moniz-
clean-energy-innovation [https://perma.cc/4PS8-EHHC] (interviewing then DOE Secretary 
Moniz on whether an “energy miracle[]” would be needed for addressing climate change). 
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As with any policy innovation, the California and New York experiments will 
yield valuable lessons, which may shorten the learning curve for others. Still, much 
work remains to be done before both programs can be combined and scaled into a 
seamless electricity trading ecosystem—a combination and extension that neither 
state envisioned. ISOs and RTOs would need to make technical and operational 
changes to their markets, and state PUCs would need to establish distribution-level 
market structures. Moreover, each program would benefit from tweaks before 
scaling it to the rest of the nation. Also, interposition of state markets between 
wholesale markets and end users would require careful design choices at the 
markets’ intersection, as discussed below. And while state policymakers are free to 
copy the New York experiment, scaling up the CAISO program to other wholesale 
markets would require FERC’s involvement. 
 
1.  Refinement and Expansion of Emerging State Programs 
 
The CAISO initiative offers a strong foundation for granting wholesale market 
access to aggregated resources nationwide. In submitting its proposal to FERC, 
CAISO noted that its DER aggregation framework was potentially scalable. 
California’s program could, if successful, be extended to other parts of the country 
through voluntary adoption by other ISOs and RTOs. This practice would require 
no fundamental change in federal regulatory authority. Indeed, FERC’s notice of 
proposed rulemaking issued in November 2016 contemplates using California as a 
model for the rest of the nation. In its proposal, the Commission requests that other 
ISOs and RTOs identify obstacles to replicating CAISO’s DER aggregation 
framework, without suggesting that new authority would be necessary to do so.224  
Successful deployment of the DER aggregation model in California may 
promote more widespread adoption by the other regional grids.225 ISOs and RTOs 
would not need to alter the basic structure of their wholesale markets to open them 
up to DER aggregators.226 In fact, some RTOs already grant market access to 
aggregated resources, for example, in the case of demand response.227 Offering the 
same treatment to DERs more broadly could prove a cost efficient remedy for 
regional grid operators seeking to alleviate capacity constraints and network 
congestion issues.  
Following the approach outlined in FERC’s proposed rule, other ISOs and 
RTOs could adopt a structure similar to California’s, developing aggregation 
systems for DERs, and allowing aggregated bids of DERs into the wholesale 																																																								
224 FERC could mandate this by order, under its authority over the wholesale markets. 
This is unlikely in the current Administration, so each ISO or RTO would likely decide for 
itself whether to follow California’s lead, as encouraged to do so by the proposed FERC rule.  
225 Of course, there is no guarantee that other ISOs and RTOs will adopt the California 
program. Recent history suggests that ISOs and RTOs can be cautious about borrowing 
innovations from their counterparts. 
226 Moreover, the wholesale markets have considerable iterative experience in revising 
market structures. Hammond & Spence, supra note 24, at 149. 
227 F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016). 
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markets for energy, capacity, ancillary services that they administer.228 Adoption of 
California’s aggregation initiative by existing ISOs and RTOs would enable DER 
participation in wholesale markets covering nearly two-thirds of the nation. Aside 
from New York and Texas, all other regional networks cover multiple states, which 
would allow DER aggregators to create larger footprints. The ability to aggregate 
resources across a multistate area could spur more robust competition among 
aggregators and help mitigate issues related to the intermittency of solar, wind, and 
other weather-dependent DERs. The same logic would suggest that the current trend 
toward expansion of regional grids229 would create even greater opportunities for 
aggregators. 
Like CAISO, other ISOs and RTOs would need to make technical and 
operational changes to accommodate DER aggregator bids, for example, by 
reforming existing markets’ rules and structures.230 At the individual DER level, the 
aggregation design relies on the DER providers, not the market administrators, to 
create and manage new market resources.231 Therefore, ISOs and RTOs will need to 
pay careful attention to the interface between aggregators and markets. Another area 
of importance is ensuring that markets are designed to send price signals to DERs 
that more accurately reflect conditions at individual systems. Current wholesale 
market designs lack the necessary spatial and temporal resolution.232 Grid operators 
concerned over reliability challenges related to DERs may set minimum and 
maximum requirements for the geographic distribution, check quantity and quality 
of aggregator bids, and follow CAISO’s example of gradually ramping up the market 
share of aggregated DERs.233 
New York’s REV initiative offers a blueprint for creating distribution-level 
markets in other states. From a political economy perspective, New York’s utilities 
have proven that incumbents can put aside their conservatism and enter into new 
roles as system administrators and platform providers. As the first state to establish 
markets for distribution-level services New York will serve as a test bed, offering 
empirical evidence for the practical viability of the next generation of restructuring 
policies.  
The New York program openly acknowledges the need for iterative policy 
learning, as illustrated by its approach to C2C transactions. The PSC order directing 																																																								
228 CAISO’s initiative does not currently include the capacity market. ORDER 
ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION, supra note 199, at 1. 
229 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (CAISO proposed expansion). 
230 See, e.g., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 
ROADMAP FOR NEW YORK’S WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 6 (2017), 
http://nyssmartgrid.com/wp-content/uploads/DRAFT-Distributed-Energy-Resources-
Roadmap-NYISO-8-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/B36G-H8W9] (envisioning replacing two 
current markets for DR with revised markets for DER participation). 
231 Under this approach, if an aggregator could not exercise technical control over an 
amount of power sufficient to meet minimum wholesale market size restrictions, it could bid 
a smaller block in the state markets.   
232 N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 230, at 24. 
233 See supra note 194, and accompanying text. 
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the establishment of markets does not provide for direct participation by individuals 
but contemplates the possibility of eventual extension, noting that, “each utility 
should evaluate the success of the marketplace and identify whether and when they 
should be expanded to include all end use consumers.”234 New York’s cautious 
approach deserves praise in an industry whose history is replete with overly 
ambitious reform efforts gone badly awry.235 In the long run, however, market access 
for end users and availability of C2C transactions will be crucial steps toward free 
trade for electric power.    
Regional wholesale markets and emerging state distribution-level markets do 
not exist in isolation from one another but, rather, will require coordination between 
regional grid operators and state PUCs on technical and operational matters. In the 
REV proceeding, the New York PSC staff noted that implementing state markets 
would require changes to wholesale market structures and coordination and 
alignment of state market rules to minimize or eliminate overlaps, including 
“communications technology and procedures, and measurement and verification 
methodologies.”236   
Further need for coordination arises to avoid double-counting and to promote 
overall system reliability: for example, ascertaining whether a specific resource was 
traded in wholesale or state markets, and not both simultaneously.237 Demand 
response and storage are two types of resources that can have value at both levels 
and would plan to capture value streams in a wide range of markets. A battery 
storage unit could conceivably bid into both wholesale and state markets, providing 
capacity or demand reduction services that require standby availability but may not 
be called upon.238 Such double-trading would promote overcompensation and could 
have adverse impacts on system reliability if, for instance, extreme weather and 
other peak demand events lead both markets to simultaneously call on the same 
resource. It would also jeopardize the availability of critical resources when they are 
needed most. Accordingly, market administrators should cooperate to prevent 																																																								
234 New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117, at 89. 
235 ISSER, supra note 87, at 459–63 (critiquing restructuring’s many failures). This 
approach is also comparable to the “adaptive management” approach scholars have proposed 
for tackling major problems such as climate change. Under this approach, policymakers 
adopt “a structured decision-making method the core of which is a multi-step iterative 
process for adjusting management measures to changing circumstances or new information 
about the effectiveness of prior measures or the system being managed.” See, e.g., Robin 
Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014); Cf. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099–100 (2009) (suggesting a similar dynamic approach for the 
relationship between states and the federal government in addressing climate change). 
236 New York DPS REV Staff Straw Proposal, supra note 216, at 43 (citing DR as an 
example).  
237 N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 230, at 22.  
238 RYAN HLEDIK & JIM LAZAR, FUTURE ELEC. UTIL. REG., DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
PRICING WITH DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 3 (May 2016), 
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/feur_4_20160518_fin-links2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU3C-
DQNZ]. 
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double-trading, work out a system of priorities for committing resources to markets, 
and track impacts at the interface between wholesale and state markets.239   
New York is an obvious test bed for addressing these and other coordination 
challenges.240 Its wholesale market operates solely within state boundaries and, 
therefore, allows for modifications without the need for another state’s consent. 
Once the state has developed expertise with the DSPP system, the regional grid 
operator New York ISO (“NYISO”) could establish an aggregation system similar 
to that of California, and coordinate it with the state markets.241 At present, DER 
aggregation is limited to demand response participation in New York’s wholesale 
market for capacity; no aggregated resource may bid in the energy market.242 
Demand response participation is further limited by restrictions that effectively bar 
participation of entities offering small-scale reductions in demand.243 It is anticipated 
that stakeholder discussions on this and other issues would take place at the same 
time the state is gaining experience with distribution-level markets. 
 
2.  Sample Transactions 
 
This section returns to the categories of transactions, and discusses how typical 
sample transactions might take place under the model, assuming markets have been 
created, and applicable state laws have been modified. As noted above, this Article’s 
taxonomy and classification of a transaction are based on its point of origin and 
ultimate terminus; regardless of any intermediate steps that are required to 
consummate it. The sample C2C transaction using wholesale markets outlined 
below, for example, would be executed through a C2B sale by the prosumer of 
energy to an aggregator followed by a B2B sale from the aggregator to a wholesale 
buyer and, ultimately, a B2C sale from that buyer to the end consumer.  																																																								
239 N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 230, at 13 (examples of required 
coordination). One way of accomplishing this is through pilot projects. See, e.g., Jan Ellen 
Spiegel, Another $1.2 Billion Substation? No Thanks, Says Utility, We’ll Find a Better Way, 
INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 4, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04042016/coned-
brooklyn-queens-energy-demand-management-project-solar-fuel-cells-climate-change 
[https://perma.cc/7CGD-NXSM] (discussing the ConED BQDM project). 
240 California could also accomplish this, but that would require the state’s PUC to 
create a system of state markets, which, as New York has shown, can take years to 
implement.  
241 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 60 (noting the importance of this and 
that New York’s wholesale market operator is already contemplating it). See generally N.Y. 
INDEP. SYS. OP., supra note 230 (providing a roadmap for a future alternative energy-based 
electrical grid). 
242 N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OP., supra note 230, at 12 (“there are limited options for DER to 
participate in NYISO’s economic programs.”); TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at 27; ICAP 
Data and Information, N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OP., http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets_operat 
ions/market_data/icap/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/KQ6Q-THPD] (last visited Sept. 9, 2017). 
243 TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at 27 (“[T]he DER cannot submit a bid in excess of 
its host’s average coincident load.”). 
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The overall transaction is characterized by looking at its beginning and 
endpoint to emphasize the status of the eventual seller and the buyer as primarily 
engaged (or not) in the profession of producing and selling energy. Moreover, this 
characterization also allows an analytical focus on the locus at which the transaction 
originates. This Article classifies the Smith-Jones transaction below as a C2C 
transaction because neither Smith nor Jones is primarily engaged in the profession 
of producing and selling energy, and because the parties are an individual seller and 
buyer operating from their residences. 
 
(a)  C2C Transactions 
 
John Smith lives in Connecticut (in the ISO-NE regional grid) and has 
solar panels on the roof of his house. He wants to sell excess midday output 
to Jane Jones, another Connecticut resident who needs power to charge 
her electric vehicle during the day.  
 
Smith has two options, depending on whether he turns to the wholesale market 
or the newly created state market. If Smith chooses the wholesale market, he would 
first have to find an aggregator interested in his power output, as his residential solar 
facility falls well short of the minimum size requirements for wholesale market 
access. The aggregator would purchase Smith’s output along with that of other DERs 
and bid them as a single block into the ISO-NE wholesale energy market.244 Due to 
the minimum size requirements for wholesale market transactions, Jones, too, 
cannot trade directly on the wholesale market, but would instead purchase power 
from her local retail supplier, which buys part or all of its power on the wholesale 
market.  
The transaction centering on the wholesale market therefore has three subparts. 
The first is Smith’s sale to the aggregator, a C2B transaction that falls squarely 
within the FPA’s definition of a sale at wholesale,245 and would be regulated by 
FERC approval of tariff changes in the ISO-NE regional grid.246 The second 
transaction is the aggregator’s sale into the ISO-NE energy market and the retail 
supplier’s purchase from it, a B2B transaction regulated under current wholesale 
market rates, also subject to FERC approval. The third is the B2C transaction in 
which the retail supplier sells electricity to Jones, regulated under state law by the 
Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority. 
  																																																								
244 The aggregation approach’s elegant simplicity in defining the physical connection 
allows Smith to forego the expense of an individual connection to ISO-NE markets and the 
complexity of wholesale market terms and conditions, all of which would be transparent to 
him.  
245 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2015). 
246 This could take place under the process contemplated in FERC’s proposed rule on 
DER aggregation, which discusses specific barriers to participation currently existing in the 
different regions. Supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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If Smith chooses the state electricity market, he can sell directly to Jones. This 
would be a pure C2C transaction where Smith sells his excess power through the 
state market’s competitive bidding process to Jones; with delivery through her local 
distribution service provider.247 Smith would receive compensation at the state 
energy market price when the transaction was settled. In practice, the fungibility of 
electric power and the commingling of electrons in the grid suggest that Jones would 
receive undifferentiated power from the grid, not “Smith’s power.”248   
The state-market route is considered superior and a major benefit of the 
proposed electricity trading ecosystem, with its ability to lower transaction costs and 
to incentivize “local” transactions that help reduce grid congestion issues. If Smith 
sells through the wholesale market, Jones will have to buy his electricity at a price 
that is based on the market clearing price, presumably including the aggregator’s 
transaction costs and profit margin, plus her local retail provider’s transaction costs 
and profit margin. In contrast, a state market-based transaction between Smith and 
Jones would cut out intermediaries, thereby reducing the parties’ transaction costs. 
From a grid congestion perspective, state markets that incorporate the local 
distribution service provider’s cost of delivery of Smith’s electricity to Jones can 
provide powerful price signals to incentivize local transactions that do not require 
costly long-distance transmission of electricity and, hence, alleviate grid congestion 
issues. 
 
(b)  C2B Transactions 
 
Tom Williams lives in rural Pennsylvania (in the PJM regional grid), and 
has solar panels on the roof of his house. He wants to sell excess midday 
output to SellerCo, a retail supplier that serves customers in Philadelphia. 
 
Williams has two options, similar to those available to John Smith but with 
some important differences. If Williams turns to the state electricity market, he can 
sell directly to SellerCo. In this scenario, Smith bids his excess power into the state 
market where SellerCo purchases it at the market clearing price. It would then be up 
to SellerCo to decide whether to sell this electricity onto its customers or whether to 
resell it on the market.  
If Williams prefers a more hands-off approach, he could sell his power to an 
aggregator in a C2B transaction subject to FERC regulation, as explained above. 
The aggregator would then combine Williams’ output with that of other DERs and 
bid them as a single block in the PJM wholesale energy market. Unlike Jones in the 
above example, SellerCo can (and does) purchase power on the wholesale market in 																																																								
247 Thus, retail choice states such as Connecticut might need to change their laws on 
electricity choice to accommodate the advent of state markets. 
248 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) 
(describing how power supplied to the grid from a variety of sources eventually merges and 
commingles just as molecules of water from different sources (rains, streams, etc.) would be 
commingled in a reservoir). 
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a B2B transaction regulated under FERC approved wholesale market tariffs. As 
before, the state-market route promises greater cost efficiency for the parties thanks 
to reduced transaction and, presumably, delivery costs. 
 
(c)  B2B Transactions 
 
Distribution utility LargeCo serves customers in states in the ISO-NE 
regional grid, and needs to purchase power to serve its customers. 
LargeCo also serves as administrator of the Connecticut state electricity 
market. 
 
LargeCo has two options. First, as it may do now, LargeCo can engage in a 
conventional B2B transaction to purchase the electricity required to meet its 
customers’ demand in wholesale markets. Under the new power trading paradigm, 
LargeCo could also turn to the state electricity market. Here, LargeCo would engage 
in the flipside of the C2B transaction described above. This example illustrates the 
flexibility that the proposed electricity trading ecosystem affords load-serving the 
entities like LargeCo to take advantage of a wider menu of supply options for serving 
their customers.  
This example further illustrates some institutional challenges posed by the new 
power trading paradigm. LargeCo’s dual role as a load serving utility and 
administrator of the state electricity market calls for functional separation between 
its business units to protect against market manipulation.249 Finally, this example 
underscores the need for coordination between market administrators to ensure 
system reliability. Absent such coordination, LargeCo’s electricity purchases from 
DER owners on the state electricity market could impact the accuracy of capacity 
requirement forecasts and, with it, supply and demand balancing in wholesale 
markets.250 
 
IV.  MOVING FORWARD: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
This new trading paradigm represents a higher plane of evolution that builds 
on, rather than altogether displaces, today’s electricity sector. Reaching this plane 
will require significant, and sometimes painful, changes to the physical, regulatory, 
and business architecture of the grid, while addressing concerns related to the 
security, reliability, and equity of the new electricity trading ecosystem. 
  																																																								
249 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 193–94.   
250 TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at 8 (noting that, “it is assumed that Distribution 
Utilities will begin, sooner or later, procuring electric products from DER to . . . cost-
effectively displace purchases of energy, ancillary services, and capacity from the relevant 
NYISO wholesale markets.”). These “direct” impacts on wholesale markets might empower 
FERC to assert authority over the state markets. Eisen, Dual Electriticy Federalism, supra 
note 5, at 15–16. 
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A.  Physical Challenges 
 
Few of the physical building blocks required to realize free trade for electric 
power currently exist in anything more than inchoate form. Even if grid owners 
endeavored to provide more widespread access to DERs and other market entrants, 
there would be no sufficient network to do so. Today’s distribution grid was 
premised on the assumption that interconnection would only be required for the 
unidirectional purposes of energy consumption. Even emerging technologies, such 
as electric vehicle charging stations that could serve as access points to the 
distribution grid are being developed for unidirectional transactions. Thus, the grid 
will have to be retrofitted with technology that enables full-scale, two-way traffic of 
electricity and, critically, related information.251 Advanced communications 
technologies can harness the internet’s ubiquity and velocity to transmit the data 
necessary for grid operators to manage, control, and integrate large numbers of 
technologically diverse distributed generation assets, demand response providers, 
and other behind-the-meter activities.252 Such upgrades, however, will not be 
possible without large-scale investment in an industry whose long-established 
regulatory structure offers little incentives for technology innovation.  
There is little precedent for using the conventional ratemaking structure to 
reward utilities for being innovators.253 On the contrary, in the absence of regulatory 
and other nudges, for example through public policy support, the electricity 
industry’s traditional ratemaking model does little to encourage investment in R&D 
for emerging energy technologies. Utility revenues in many states are based on cost-
of-service regulation. Under this approach, PUCs approve electricity rates based on 
the utility’s cost of service, offering an allowed rate of return designed to enable 
electric utilities to raise necessary funds on capital markets. While this rate structure 
has been shown to encourage capital expenditures beyond the socially optimal 
level,254 it does not necessarily incentivize R&D investment as PUCs rarely include  
																																																								
251 Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism, supra note 5 and accompanying text; David J. 
Unger, How an Obscure Piece of Technology Will Help Put More Solar on the Grid, 
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2016), http://midwestenergynews.com/2016/08/09/how-
an-obscure-piece-of-technology-will-help-put-more-solar-on-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6ANY-HSSU] (discussing smart inverters). 
252 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 37–38. 
253 As New York’s PSC observed in the REV proceeding, most state regulation rewards 
utilities for capital investments. New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117, at 32 
(noting the “lack of an incentive to innovate, bias toward capital expenditures, and 
asymmetry of information in the rate-setting process”).   
254 Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
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R&D expenditures in their rate-base calculations.255 It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that several studies have shown rate regulation to be a disincentive to R&D spending 
and innovation.256 
 
B.  Regulatory Challenges 
 
The most significant impediment to progress toward an electricity trading 
ecosystem is the dated regulatory structure governing electricity distribution systems 
across the nation.257 The scope of change necessary to allow the grid’s aging physical 
architecture to accommodate distributed generation, demand response, and other 
innovative energy technologies will require reform of the underlying regulatory 
institutions, structures, and processes.  
The introduction of state electricity markets—a cornerstone of the proposed 
electricity trading ecosystem—would require rethinking the regulatory approach 
that has governed retail electricity sales for over a century. New market structures, 
combined with regulatory oversight to ensure their fairness, would become an 
important primary means of ensuring that electricity rates to end users are just and 
reasonable. This will require much of state regulators, including the vision to 
anticipate how markets can fail and how consumers can be protected from 
exaggerated price fluctuations and other fallout from these market failures. The good 
news is that state regulators need not start from scratch but, instead, can turn to the 
similar transformation well underway in the regulation of wholesale transactions that 
are increasingly executed on competitive markets for critical guidance. Following 
the wholesale markets’ overwhelmingly positive example, sophisticated regulatory 
designs—that carefully establish and delimit the market structures, terms and 
conditions of exchange—combined with constant oversight and timely interventions 
where necessary can contain the risks to consumers associated with regulatory 
innovation. 
Such regulatory innovation will not be possible without new laws, regulations, 
and institutional reform, as illustrated by the example of New York’s REV efforts. 
This Article calls on PUCs to convert the core functions of their regulation of 
distribution utilities from rate setting to market oversight. This would entail 
substantial revisions to the traditional utility ratemaking model. Prior to New York’s 
recent initiative, no state was willing to compensate a utility for transforming its 																																																								
255 See Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, Liberalisation and R&D in Network 
Industries: The Case of the Electricity Industry, 37 RES. POL’Y 995, 1005 (2008). 
256 See, e.g., Mark W. Frank, An Empirical Analysis of Electricity Regulation on 
Technical Change in Texas, 22 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 313, 315 (2003); John W. Mayo & 
Joseph E. Flynn, The Effects of Regulation on Research and Development: Theory and 
Evidence, 61 J. OF BUS. 321, 331 (1988). See also Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and 
Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 597 (1969) (warning, as early as 1969, against the 
stifling effects of rate regulation on innovation). 
257 Navigating the Energy Transformation, supra note 52, at 16 (nearly 50% of survey 
respondents identified this as the greatest legacy challenge facing the industry over the next 
decade). 
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business model from compensation for the delivery (and often generation) of 
electricity to that of market administrator.258 As noted above in the sample 
transactions, PUCs will also have to monitor markets carefully to ensure that the 
utility-turned-administrator does not offer preferential treatment to its own resources 
at the expense of other market participants. All of this will require considerable 
reworking of state laws and provoke massive uncertainty, at least in the near term, 
with the potential for conflict and turf wars among actors whose roles in the system 
have been largely ossified over time.  
The silver lining, however, is that the proposed ecosystem will ultimately 
require less regulatory intervention, not more. In a system where electricity and 
related products and services are traded freely among a large number of diverse 
actors, regulators will no longer need to rely on their limited expertise with DERs 
and often incomplete utility disclosures to set electricity rates, leaving the 
determination of clearing prices to the market’s invisible hand. Nor will rate 
determinations take years and require the substantial transaction costs of rate cases; 
markets can be much nimbler. Properly designed and administered markets that 
serve, among others, as conduits for critical information should further help with the 
controversial task of assessing the true value of solar based on local demand, 
transmission congestion, and other factors.259  
The new trading paradigm will also require difficult conversations about the 
evolving allocation of authority over the electric grid between state and federal 
regulators. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of federal 
jurisdiction over electricity regulation,260 states continue to supervise distribution 
utilities and will have substantial responsibility for shaping the new power trading 
paradigm. The proposed introduction of state-sponsored electricity markets at the 
distribution level is a tribute to the pivotal role of state regulation in the electricity 
sector.  
																																																								
258 New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117, at 37.  
259 Increasingly, states such as Minnesota are turning to “value of solar” studies and 
proceedings to measure solar energy’s value. Mike Taylor et al., Value of Solar: Program 
Design and Implementation Considerations, NAT’L RENEW. ENERGY LAB. (Mar. 2015), 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62361.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RFW-3JM5]; Benjamin L. 
Norris et al., Minnesota Value of Solar: Methodology, CLEAN POWER RES. (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.cleanpower.com/wp-content/uploads/MN-VOS-Methodology-2014-01-30-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X7R-EDC8]. How this value is defined has sparked 
considerable controversy. See, e.g., Jim Lazar & Thomas Vitolo, The Value of Solar: 
Assessing the Benefits, the Costs, and What it May Mean for Net Energy Metering, REG. 
ASSIST. PROJ. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.raponline.org/event/the-value-of-solar-
assessing-the-benefits-the-costs-and-what-it-may-mean-for-net-energy-metering/ 
[https://perma.cc/5FLM-263G]. 
260 F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 760 (Jan. 25, 2016, revised 
Jan. 28, 2016); see also Joel B. Eisen, The Supreme Court’s New Electricity Federalism, 
BNA INSIGHTS (May 20, 2016), http://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=2376&context=law-faculty-publications [https://perma.cc/XT62-93ZX]. 
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FERC, meanwhile, retains considerable authority over wholesale markets, 
another key component of this proposal. The DER aggregation structure is 
functionally similar to the mechanism the Supreme Court approved for bidding 
demand response into wholesale markets in its recent FERC v. EPSA decision. It 
stands to reason, therefore, that FERC has sufficient authority to approve individual 
ISO/RTOs’ aggregation proposals, as it did with CAISO. The new power trading 
paradigm respects FERC’s authority by reserving larger-scale transactions for the 
wholesale markets. This, too, is consistent with the popular understanding of the 
FPA’s language: the dictionary defines “wholesale” as “the sale of commodities in 
quantity usually for resale.”261  
By relying on state markets as the default venue for direct sales to (and from) 
end users, this proposal reduces jurisdictional tension. The FPA’s definition of 
“wholesale” forecloses direct purchases by consumers, as it extends federal 
authority only to sales for resale of electric energy.262 The Act’s core statutory 
provisions have not changed in over 80 years, and it is unlikely that Congress will 
amend the statute to permit direct consumer purchases in wholesale markets. After 
all, any such proposal would be met with considerable backlash from state PUCs 
concerned over the resulting dilution of their authority over retail sales of electricity. 
Some sales on state markets could impact the wholesale markets. If, for 
example, a seller could choose whether to bid into wholesale or state markets, 
choosing the latter over the former might affect wholesale market prices. Under 
FERC v. EPSA, this might be sufficient to trigger FERC jurisdiction over the rules 
governing the intersection between the two markets as a “practice affecting rates.” 
There has been considerable uncertainty about the interplay of federal and state 
jurisdiction in situations where rules might need to be developed to manage the 
intersection between markets.263 Regulators should be expected to work 




261 Wholesale, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016). 
262 16 U.S.C. § 824(d). As one logical outgrowth of this delineation, state markets could 
trade anything other than “electric energy,” including energy management services.  
263 See, e.g., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 230, at 4–5 (noting various 
possible actions to incorporate DERs into New York’s wholesale markets to, among other 
objectives, “[a]lign with the goals of NYS REV.”).  
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C.  Economic Challenges 
 
From an economic perspective, the proposed power trading paradigm creates 
considerable risks and opportunities for incumbent utilities. After decades of 
regulatory protection, many utilities have little experience with the threat of 
competition, let alone assessing whether innovative products and services will 
succeed in the marketplace.264 The proposed C2C transactions are certain to elicit 
considerable opposition from utilities who fear erosion of their market share. Even 
if utilities are guaranteed appropriate compensation for use of their distribution 
assets, their revenues will still depend on market-based pricing and, hence, be hard 
to forecast.  
Whether utilities will eventually embrace change is difficult to ascertain. If 
recent developments in New York are any indication, it seems that utilities may 
cautiously embrace the trading future. To illustrate, consider lessons learned from 
the theory on disruption of industries to monopolists, as in the case of Uber’s 
disruption of the taxicab industry. One major caveat is in order at the outset: the 
concept of “disruption” has been co-opted and diluted almost to the point of 
meaninglessness.265 Popular wisdom about the disruption narrative is that a new 
technology enters the scene and quickly displaces the old with a business model 
superior to the previous one. Some opine any large legacy industry can—or should—
be ripe for bypassing of incumbents by innovators who start with little more than 
ideas and crash sessions developing computer code.266 Like the taxicab industry, the 
electric distribution industry consists of regulated monopolies, often portrayed as 
economic dinosaurs less nimble at innovation than their counterparts, and ripe for 
the immediate taking.  
The literature on disruptive technologies cautions against the narrative of 
immediate dislocation as a less-than-accurate portrayal of transformative change. 
Instead, disruptive innovation theory, as first popularized by Harvard professor 
Clayton Christensen, suggests that “disruption” describes a process whereby a 
smaller company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established 
incumbents by targeting overlooked segments of the value chain, gaining a foothold 
by delivering more suitable functionality—frequently at a lower price.267 Then, the 
incoming firm moves up the value chain, eventually displacing the incumbent firm 
in the provision of its product or service.268 Some caution is in order here, as 																																																								
264 Id. This suggests that it would be challenging for an incumbent utility to transform 
into an “iUtility” or “utility 2.0,” as some suggest. See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the 
Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL. L. 931, 943 (2009). 
265 Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Dec. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation [https://perma.cc/REU4-
48F8]. 
266 See, e.g., ANTONIO GARCIA MARTINEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE FORTUNE AND 
RANDOM FAILURE IN SILICON VALLEY (2016) (expressing this sentiment). 
267 Eisen, “Disruptive” Technology, supra note 36, at 62. 
268 Solar panels are an example of this because they promote different attributes such 
as self generation. Id.; Seth Blumsack, Why rooftop solar is disruptive to utilities—and the 
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Christensen’s theory has been criticized for its post hoc perspective that makes it 
prone to hindsight biases.269 And the oft-quoted example of Uber is not a disruptive 
innovation for two reasons: Uber did not arise by “appealing to low end or unserved 
consumers and then migrat[ing] to the mainstream market,” nor did it offer a product 
that existing customers initially viewed as inferior.270 Uber offered the very same 
product as taxicab incumbents—rides. Christensen distinguishes this from 
disruptions, calling it a “sustaining innovation” that makes the existing product 
better.271 
Despite its limitations, Christensen’s theory has considerable appeal in this 
context for explaining how incumbent firms resist change. He argues that forcing 
full industry disruption will prompt incumbents to accelerate efforts to defend their 
business by offering even better services or products at comparable prices, acquiring 
entrants, or resisting change with any other means at their disposal, particularly if 
they enjoy monopoly protection.272 Taxi companies, for example, have worked 
through municipal governments to resist Uber and other ride-sharing services.  
It seems only logical, therefore, that incumbent utilities will resist efforts to turn 
them into independent distribution system operators. The past experience with retail 
restructuring is telling, as moving from the relative safety of cost-of-service 
regulation to a completely market-based, freewheeling competitive environment 
would be as risky for utilities in some ways as retail restructuring was. Many electric 
utilities resisted retail restructuring with a wide variety of strategies,273 including 
often exaggerated claims that their investments were “stranded costs” for which they 
must be compensated.274 Any reform efforts should, therefore, prepare for a variety 
of utility strategies to respond to the transformative changes already under way275 																																																								
grid, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 24, 2015), https://theconversation.com/why-rooftop-solar-
is-disruptive-to-utilities-and-the-grid-39032 [https://perma.cc/54GY-TP6A].   
269 Eisen, “Disruptive” Technology, supra note 36, at 62. 
270 Christensen et al., supra note 265. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 459–61 (2005) (describing the opposition 
from utilities that were “leading the quiet, comfortable life of an ineffectively regulated 
monopolist and had no desire to be thrust into a new world in which they would actually 
have to compete to survive and prosper”).     
274 Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 
BROOK. L. REV. 645, 661–62 (2017). Hammond and Rossi claim that utilities routinely 
overstated their stranded costs, and that state regulators and legislators routinely approved 
these claims. Id. at 661.  
275 Press Release, New York Public Service Comm’n, Public Service Commission 
Approves Restructuring of Utility Regulations to Combat Climate Change & Achieve 
Nation-Leading Clean Energy Goals, at 2 (May 19, 2016), https://www3.dps.ny.gov/pscweb/ 
webfileroom.nsf/Web/9B4FB5513905CB5985257FB8006DAD48/$File/pr16028.pdf?Ope
nElement [https://perma.cc/72TA-SWFA] (“[T]he current utility and regulatory model could 
lead to uneconomic grid defection and eventually result in stranded investments and 
increasing financial challenges.”). 
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and those proposed here; including outright resistance. However, the New York 
REV proceedings offer cause for hope that incumbent utilities may, ultimately, 
embrace the transition to a new system of markets.  
As for new entrants into the electricity sector, they tend to have fundamentally 
different resources and competences than incumbents. New entrants enter the scene 
armed with different technologies and more efficient processes tailored to compete 
successfully in these disruptive markets.276 In the end, however, their ability to 
succeed often depends on the evolutionary and revolutionary discoveries they make 
and on crucial support from federal and state governments to help overcome market 
barriers.277 
 
D.  Security and Reliability Challenges 
 
Revamping the distribution system will have numerous implications for 
reliability, security, and privacy, presenting complex challenges to state regulators 
whose principal task until now was ensuring the provision of sufficient electricity to 
meet demand under the cost-of-service ratemaking model.   
In terms of reliability, DERs’ intermittent output can lead to greater forecast 
errors and exacerbate the risk of adverse system impacts. Recent research shows that 
large shares of solar, wind, and other intermittent renewables can be integrated into 
the grid without negative impacts on the reliability of service.278 Increased output 
volatility and forecast uncertainty for DERs and other renewables will, however, 
require greater efforts by grid operators and ancillary service providers.279 An 
intelligent mix of DERs could help alleviate some of these problems if, for example, 
demand response was used to balance the intermittency of solar and wind 
resources.280 
As Amy Stein has noted, “reliability” in the changing mix of resources in the 
electricity sector now encompasses a wide range of actions necessary to maintain 
system performance.281 The evolving scope and nature of reliability services raise 
questions about the governance structure for assuring reliability and where 
responsibility for any one reliability initiative or standard should fall. At the 
wholesale level, balancing authorities are required to meet federally mandated 																																																								
276 Christensen et al., supra note 265. 
277 Eisen, “Disruptive” Technology, supra note 36, at 65–67; supra note 61 and 
accompanying text (discussing transaction costs of selling excess power on wholesale 
markets). 
278 See Mormann et al., supra note 25, at 71 (reporting reductions in average system 
outage times for California and Germany despite substantial increases in the share of 
intermittent renewables in the electricity mix). 
279 Id. at 88 (reporting a near fivefold increase in grid operator interventions in Germany 
from 2009 to 2013). 
280 Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and the Smart 
Grid, 7 U. HOUS. ENVTL. AND ENERGY L. AND POL’Y J. 191, 201–05 (2012). 
281 Stein, supra note 176, at 1194. 
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reliability standards that define requirements for planning and operations.282 
Maintaining reliable operation of the local distribution grid, meanwhile, falls to the 
states. The new power trading paradigm would require increasing interactions 
between the two systems that warrant regulatory attention to ensure proper 
coordination and a shared allocation of responsibilities across federal and state 
regulators.283  
The proliferation of DERs and the resulting decentralization of grid assets and 
(to some extent) control, also present potential new security vulnerabilities.284 
Increased reliance on markets that require the instantaneous exchange of large data 
volumes exacerbates vulnerabilities. The October 2016 attack on the Internet aptly 
demonstrates the severe risks of failing to properly address cybersecurity 
challenges.285 Many DERs and devices that control them will be located at customer 
sites with little or no computer security and with owners who have minimal or no 
cybersecurity expertise. DER interactions involve many different domains and 
organizations, and no single entity has yet been tasked with maintaining 
cybersecurity. Many different communication protocols and standards are currently 
being used that often have inadequate security capabilities. Some DERs are 
automated and others will rely on wireless communications, adding further 
opportunities for attack. Finally, while research is underway to address these 
challenges,286 experts who understand both DER functionality and cybersecurity are 
few and far between.287  
																																																								
282 U.S. Mandatory Standards Subject to Enforcement, NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY 
CORP., http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/ReliabilityStandardsUnitedStates.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Y9EX-SAQ7] (last visited Sept. 7, 2017). 
283 SUSAN F. TIERNEY, THE VALUE OF ‘DER’ TO ‘D’: THE ROLE OF DISTRIBUTED 
ENERGY RESOURCES IN SUPPORTING LOCAL ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM RELIABILITY, 
ANALYSIS GROUP REP. at ES-2 (Mar. 2016) (discussing importance of both in maintaining 
reliability with increased DER deployment); see also Distributed Energy Resources: 
Connection, Modeling and Reliability Considerations, NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP 
(Nov. 2016), http://www.nerc.com/comm/Other/essntlrlbltysrvcstskfrcDL/May%202016% 
20Meeting%20Materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UZX-HMKE] (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) 
(materials of NERC task force discussing these issues). 
284 Cyber Security for DER Systems, ELEC. POWER RES. INST.1–3 (July 2013), 
http://smartgrid.epri.com/doc/der%20rpt%2007-30-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE34-9KY2] 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2017); MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 4; COMM. ON 
ENHANCING THE ROBUSTNESS AND RESILIENCE OF FUTURE ELEC. TRANSMISSION AND 
DISTRIB. IN THE U.S. TO TERRORIST ATTACK, TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRICAL POWER 
DELIVERY SYSTEM, 83–86 (The National Academies Press, 2012). 
285 Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites Across 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/business/internet-
problems-attack.html [https://perma.cc/8H7U-WP5G]. 
286 See, e.g., Protecting U.S. Economic Health Through Port Cybersecurity, CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INST., http://ciri.illinois.edu/ [https://perma.cc/KD95-B8H9] 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2017). 
287 ELEC. POWER RES. INST., supra note 284, at 3. 
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As yet, there is no regularized means of addressing these issues, except for 
federal standards applicable to the bulk power system.288 Some frameworks offer 
guidelines for utilities,289 but they lack the granularity necessary to identify and 
address problems faced by individual PUCs that may require strategies tailored to 
their specific network circumstances. One recent review of implementation of the 
frameworks stated that they “lack concrete, practical procedures that implement” 
them290 resulting in a patchwork of standards and procedures. Many PUCs have yet 
to act concretely, often due to a lack of in-house expertise paired with limited 
awareness of their own system vulnerabilities and the range of available strategies.291 
In short, the technologies and market frameworks that would bring about a 
modern grid would simultaneously increase the grid’s potential vulnerabilities, 
particularly at the interfaces between DERs and the rest of the grid. The new 
electricity trading ecosystem will, therefore, require significant and concerted efforts 
to analyze vulnerabilities and develop protective measures to mitigate physical and 
cybersecurity issues. 
From a privacy perspective, finally, the new power trading paradigm’s reliance 
on markets may require fundamentally redefined frameworks for data handling and 
privacy. Market designers in New York have already identified a wide range of 
system data that could be made more readily available to nonutility actors. ESCOs 
and others could use this data to identify and meet potential customer needs through 
new products and services added to their market offerings.292 Scholars have already 
identified privacy concerns with collecting data from smart meters, particularly if 
the data could be released to a third party without customer authorization.293 																																																								
288 The U.S. bulk power system’s mandatory federal reliability standards include 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) standards for cybersecurity, developed by NERC and 
approved by FERC. In 2013, FERC approved Version 5 of the CIP Standards. NORTH AM. 
ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 282; for a discussion of the eight CIP standards, see 
Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting 
Our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 346–50 
(2013). 
289 The National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the National Association 
of Regulatory Commissioners have produced cybersecurity guidelines for PUCs. Smart Grid 
Interoperability Panel—Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee, Guidelines for Smart 
Regulators, NAT’L ASS’N OF STANDARDS AND TECH. (Sept. 2014); Miles Keogh & Christina 
Cody, Cybersecurity for State Regulators, NAT’L ASS’N OF REG. UTIL. COMM’RS (2012).   
290 SGIP’s–Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee, Implementing Cybersecurity 




291 Peter Behr & Blake Sobczak, States Search for Strong Cyberdefense Strategies, 
E&E NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060013552%20cyberse 
[https://perma.cc/CG2X-DHFP] (31 states have neither cybersecurity rules or orders nor 
ongoing dockets to develop them). 
292 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 199–200. 
293 See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 55, at 1117–18. 
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Pioneering states such as California have responded with statutory and regulatory 
policies designed to provide safeguards.294 Increased reliance on markets and the 
robust exchange of information will require increased attention to data security and 
privacy issues. 
 
E.  Equity Challenges 
 
Like any change of this magnitude, the transformation of electricity from a 
basic service to a widely traded commodity has implications for distributional 
fairness and equity.295 However diverse the pool of participants in an electricity 
trading economy, it will create economic winners and losers. A middle-class 
homeowner with good credit, for example, may be able to put solar panels on his 
roof to generate and sell his own electricity in newly created markets. The same 
economic opportunities, however, may not be available to renters or homeowners 
with less access to capital or debt.296 From a ratepayer perspective, a two-class 
system may emerge that enables some ratepayers to actively participate in and 
benefit from the newly created markets while others continue to consume electricity 
in the same passive role they have had since the early days of electrification. 
Carefully crafted incentives and rules for market participation can mitigate but not 
altogether eliminate these and other inequities.297  
Still, the proposed power trading paradigm will, on the whole, prove more 
equitable than the current system for two reasons. First, liquidity and transparency 
are not simply virtues of well-designed markets and necessary for innovation in the 
grid. Some commentators fear that, in the current policy landscape, certain benefits 
of renewable energy flow disproportionately to a select few due to knowledge and 
cost asymmetries.298 In response, open access, combined with market opportunities 
for new types of resources, will allow for more widespread popular participation in 																																																								
294 Eisen, Smart Regulation, supra note 5, at 16–17; see DECISION ADOPTING RULES TO 
PROTECT THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF ELECTRICITY USAGE DATA OF THE CUSTOMERS OF 
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CO., SO. CAL. EDISON CO., AND SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC 
CO., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (July 29, 2011), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_ 
DECISION/140369.pdf [https://perma.cc/39CX-66XX]. 
295 See, e.g., Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 577 
(2015); Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY L. 115, 125 (2014–2015); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Equity, UTAH L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
296 See, e.g., Katharine Kollins et al., Solar PV Project Financing: Regulatory and 
Legislative Challenges for Third-Party PPA System Owners, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LABORATORY (Feb. 2010), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46723.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
K66W-EVTL] (describing the process and requirements for financing residential solar 
installations); Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 146, at 334 (critiquing the need for 
hefty tax bills or costly tax equity to benefit from federal tax incentives as an impediment to 
more widespread deployment of small-scale solar facilities). 
297 See, e.g., 2013 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 414 (S.B. 13-252) (2013) (promoting 
community solar installations). 
298 See, e.g., Welton, supra note 295, at 573–74. 
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the electricity sector than the utility-centric status quo, thereby creating more 
winners than losers.  
Second, the new electricity trading ecosystem will accelerate the deployment 
of solar, storage, and other sustainable energy technologies that deliver considerable 
environmental benefits, such as climate change mitigation, air quality 
improvements, and water conservation. These benefits cannot be appropriated by 
the economic beneficiaries but, rather, spill over to the general public. Studies have 
repeatedly shown that socioeconomically disadvantaged parts of the population 
suffer from higher exposure levels to electricity-related environmental pollutants.299 
As solar, wind, and other sustainable energy technologies replace coal and other 
fossil-fueled power plants, the associated environmental benefits will accrue 
disproportionately to low-income communities.  
This Article does not conclude that liquid markets will address all equity 
concerns,300 but market structures that reduce barriers to access can catalyze 
significant progress toward involvement of a broader spectrum of participants. This 
Article does not argue that markets always broaden participation; consolidation of 
the past few decades in industries such as the airlines suggests otherwise. There can 
be little doubt, however, that the proposed power trading paradigm offers a more 
inclusive and, hence, superior alternative to today’s monopolistic domination of 
distribution systems and extremely limited consumer choice. 
 
F.  Other Policy Considerations 
 
Public utilities have traditionally assumed the obligation to serve customers 
within their service territories, although the “duty to serve” has been modified in 
states that have embraced retail restructuring.301 Even restructured states with a more 
competitive environment, however, typically require distribution utilities to serve 
retail customers, naming them as “provider of last resort” for what is also known as 
“standard offer” service.302 The provider of last resort serves as the backstop supplier 
of electricity for customers who have not chosen an alternative supplier. The advent 
of state electricity markets proposed in this Article will require PUCs to take similar 
measure in order to ensure reliable service for consumers who choose not to rely on 
the markets for all or part of their electricity needs.  
To be clear, the proposed electricity trading ecosystem is not intended to force 
consumers happy with their current electricity service to switch to market-based 
procurement. Rather, the framework presumes that markets will coexist with the 
existing electricity distribution system for the foreseeable future. In keeping with the 																																																								
299 See, e.g., Siler-Evans et al., supra note 34; Levy & Spengler, supra note 134, at 1–
2. 
300 For example, if nothing is done to address the cost and financing of renewable 
energy systems, open access alone would be insufficient. See Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, 
supra note 146, at 355; Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy, supra note 13. 
301 Jim Rossi, The Common Law ‘Duty to Serve’ and Protection of Consumers in an 
Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1248 (1998). 
302 ISSER, supra note 87, at 199–200. 
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evolutionary nature of this proposal, the new power trading paradigm is intended to 
create new opportunities to trade electricity for interested parties. Thus, today’s 
distribution utilities are anticipated to continue to provide the equivalent of standard 
offers to customers who choose not to avail themselves of the markets. 
The coexistence of new markets alongside the tried-and-true system of utility 
service to customers poses distinct challenges for market design. Consider, for 
example, the interdependence between standard offers and market competition: 
more of the former might lead to less of the latter and vice versa.303 The terms and 
conditions of standard offer service, therefore, are bound to impact pricing and other 
attributes of the platform. Standard offer rates, for instance, will shape the 
attractiveness of the markets and arbitrage opportunities for utilities serving as 
platform administrators, as is the case in states that adopted retail restructuring.  
Another issue that warrants attention is long-term planning, akin to the 
ISOs/RTOs’ planning processes. Some propose that distribution utilities use an 
“integrated distribution planning” (“IDP”) process, similar to the familiar 
“integrated resource planning” (“IRP”) that utilities undertake in a majority of states, 
including some with restructured retail electricity markets.304 In an IDP process, the 
distribution utility would proactively forecast the potential for DER growth on its 
system, and plan for its integration. For example, the utility might be required to 
identify infrastructure necessary to accommodate a specific anticipated resource 
coming online.305 Building on this work, the authors recommend a planning process 
that forecasts resources brought to a platform over the near and long term. Following 
the IRP example, the goal of this process is not to change the network, but to 
accommodate an influx of DERs on it. This function could be provided by the market 
administrator, as envisioned by the New York REV proceedings,306 or by another 




At the dawn of the new millennium, Sir Arthur C. Clarke famously predicted 
that by 2016, all currencies would be abolished, and the megawatt hour of electricity 
would become the standard unit of exchange.307 Clarke would find it strange that no 																																																								
303 One recent report cites this as a byproduct of experience to date with retail choice 
programs. Morey et al., supra note 46, at 7 (claiming that caps on POLR prices hinder 
competition). 
304 See, e.g., Tim Lindl & Kevin Fox, Integrated Distribution Planning Concept Paper: 
A Proactive Approach for Accommodating High Penetrations of Distributed Generation 
Resources, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, INC. at 9–10 (May 2013), 
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[https://perma.cc/C9XT-3K8G]; MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 46. 
305 Lindl & Fox, supra note 304, at 10.    
306 Under the REV framework, this is accomplished in the Distributed System 
Implementation Plans. New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117 and accompanying 
text. 
307 See Arthur C. Clarke, Beyond 2001, 6 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 160 (1995). 
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consumer markets exist today for electricity, one of the most omnipresent and 
indispensable commodities. A properly designed electricity trading ecosystem will 
have the pervasiveness and liquidity that motivated Clarke’s prediction.  
A kilowatt hour of electricity is, in many ways, as fungible as an ear of corn or 
a bushel of wheat. There are, however, critical differences that distinguish electricity 
from other commodities and, even more so, currencies. Unlike food crops and most 
other commodities, electric power cannot be shipped long distance by truck, rail, or 
vessel but, instead, requires delivery through a sophisticated and costly network of 
transmission and distribution lines. Outside of extreme inflation or deflation events, 
one U.S. dollar will buy the same amount of bread regardless of the time of day. In 
contrast, the value of a kilowatt hour of electricity may easily vary by a factor of ten 
or more depending on what time of day it is deliveredgenerated. These and other 
spatiotemporal sensitivities of electric power not only stand in the way of Sir Arthur 
Clarke’s prophecy, they require a radical rethinking of America’s electricity 
industry. 
Much of the physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and business 
models of today’s electric grid date back to the early days of electrification when 
electricity was generated by monopoly utilities in large, remotely sited power plants 
and delivered to ratepayers via wires designed for one way traffic. These structures 
may have helped establish America’s electricity industry. But they are ill-equipped 
to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the proliferation of smaller-
scale distributed energy resources at the edge of the grid, fast-paced technology and 
business model innovation, and anthropogenic climate change, among others. 
This Article proposes a new electricity trading ecosystem that relies on a system 
of competitive markets to bring the electric utility industry into the twenty-first 
century. This Article refines and expands pilot initiatives currently under way in 
California and New York to complement existing wholesale power markets with 
new distribution-level markets that enable widespread participation in electricity 
trading, from incumbent utilities to residential ratepayers. Enhanced market access 
will allow previously captive consumers to emancipate themselves from their local 
utilities while also ensuring the proper valuation of energy resources based on their 
spatiotemporal generation characteristics. 
The electric utility industry has famously resisted reform efforts of any sort for 
decades. And change, however necessary and beneficial in the long run, will not 
come easily, let alone overnight. Accordingly, this proposal does not start with a 
clean slate but, rather, envisions a hybrid system where competitive markets under 
the auspices of state and federal regulators coexist with traditional utility governance 
structures until regulators and stakeholders alike have had time to adjust to the new 
market realities. 
The proposed power trading paradigm is not without its own growing pains and 
challenges, such as those related to the reliability, security, and equity implications 
of the new electricity trading ecosystem. Some might question, for example, whether 
markets can protect consumer interests as well as rate regulation. The answer to 
these and other questions will depend on the choices of state and federal regulators 
that will likely evolve over time. Mindful of these iterative policy learning processes, 
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the authors have here laid out the core goals and attributes deemed indispensable 
elements of an ecosystem that facilitates free trade for electric power, leaving design 
and implementation details for future research and policy experimentation across the 
state laboratories of democracy. 
